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Abstract
This paper focuses on the link between economic rights and institutions. Sim-
ple analysis of data is used to demonstrate countries’ human development effort in
advancing economics rights of the citizens. A country’s human development effort
is evaluated on the basis of the well-being of the poorest members of the society.
An analysis of data reveals that there is a wide variation in countries’ pro-poor
stance. While it is accepted that positive rights are pro-poor, this paper argues that
so too are negative economic rights and in fact the two are complements rather
than substitutes. Classifying countries into human development income deficit
and human development effort deficit, it is demonstrated that a large number of
countries could achieve higher welfare levels for the poor if they improved on
bother positive and negative economic rights. The paper attempts to explain vari-
ations in the observed commitment to economic rights by focusing on pro-poor
institutions. The basic thesis advanced in the paper is that pro-poor policies are
more likely to be implemented and sustained in those institutions where power is
sufficiently diffused such that even the poor have leverage over policy outcomes.
The paper focuses on how institutions impact on power diffusion and therefore
the adoption of pro-poor growth and policies. The failure of countries to adopt
pro-poor growth and policies is attributed to institutional failures manifested in
concentration of power. The policy recommendations emanating from the anal-
ysis focus on institutional reforms to enhance power diffusion. These policies
include enlarging the political space through democratization, strengthening in-
stitutions and capacity to fight corruption and improve transparency, and bringing
the government closer to the people through appropriate design and implemen-
tation of decentralization schemes. Some recent examples of improvements in
economic rights following power diffusion are provided.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: O15, I30, I31
Paper prepared for presentation at the Economics Rights Conference orga-
nized by the Human Rights Institute, University of Connecticut, October 27-29,
2005. An earlier version of this paper entitled ”Institutions of Governance, Power
Diffusion and Pro-Poor Growth and Policies,” was presented at a Senior Pol-
icy seminar organized by African Economic Research Consortium, March 22-24,
2005, Cape Town, South Africa. I am grateful to members of the Economic Rights
Reading Group for helpful comments and suggestions.
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1.       Introduction 
 
Economists are not “big” on human rights. This is particularly true for “positive rights” 
which require prescribing actions by governments and even more so in regard to economic 
rights broadly interpreted to mean positive actions to enhance quality of life through 
redistribution or other collective actions.  Economists, particularly those of the classical 
liberalism tradition consider such “social justice” rights as inconsistent to economic growth 
and thus should not be part of a country’s constitution.  To the extent that economists 
advocate for “economic rights”, this is basically in regard to the rights to engage in 
productive activities with minimal interference or negative economic rights—commonly 
refereed to as economic freedom.  To the extent that governments should prescribe policy, 
such should focus on pre-conditions for markets to function efficiently else government 
should not direct the actions of market participants.  According to economists, economic 
freedom associates with economic growth and wealth accumulation benefiting all members 
of the society.  In fact, ample empirical evidence exists that shows that economic freedom is 
a primary determinant of economic growth and development (Berggren 2003). Because of 
there is strong link between economic growth and poverty reduction, economists tend to 
argue that positive economic rights should not be prioritized if conditions for economic 
freedom exist.  In fact, positive rights are considered counterproductive to the extent that 
they may involve infringement on economic freedom.   
 There is no doubt that economic growth is necessary for the improvement of the 
well-being of all members of the society.   Sustained reductions in the levels of poverty 
require consistent high and sustained rates of economic growth and wealth creation. But 
economic growth is not synonymous with poverty reduction—higher levels of national 
incomes do not necessarily translate into lower poverty or overall improvement in well-being 
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of the poor. Evidence shows that episodes of economic growth are not always associated 
with poverty reduction. As such, the relationship between economic growth and poverty can 
be weak. In fact, there are cases whereby economic growth has been associated with 
increased poverty. Thus, economic growth, and therefore increases in national income, does 
not necessarily imply that the well-being of the poor improves substantially. It is for this 
reason that policy makers should be concerned not just about instituting policies for 
economic growth, but rather policies to achieve pro-poor growth.  Recent concern on 
meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has brought to the fore the 
importance of focusing on pro-poor growth and policies. 
There is extensive literature on growth—especially on the determinants of economic 
growth. The predominant literature focuses on getting the prices right and creating a 
conducive environment for business—achieving macroeconomic stability, freeing the market  
of impediments so that market forces direct economic activity, etc. These policies generally 
involve improvements in measures of economic freedom and have been part of the primary 
policy menu prescribed to developing countries by international development institutions 
and donor countries. Policies such as liberalization and structural adjustments are all meant 
to align prices with the expectation that such reforms would lead to increased market 
activity, economic growth and overall development.  However, developing-country 
experiences with such adjustment policies in regard to the well-being of the poor, and in fact 
to sustained economic growth, has been disappointing.  To a large extent, market reforms as 
instituted in the 1970s and 1980s tended to result in increased poverty. While in many cases 
those reforms did in fact result in economic growth, the gains from growth did not trickle 
down sufficiently enough to reduce poverty and instead resulted in increased inequality. 
Even more of concern are cases whereby market reforms did not result in sustained 
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economic growth and instead the outcome was slow growth and increased poverty.1  There 
is no question that market reforms are necessary to achieve economic growth and that 
economic growth is necessary for poverty reduction. However, economic growth is itself not 
sufficient for poverty reduction. 
This paper focuses on institutions and governance aspects of “economic rights,” broadly 
defined.2 We focus not just on growth but pro-poor growth and policies. In the section that 
follows, we briefly explore some of the links between economic growth and poverty 
reduction. The section focuses specifically on the link between growth, inequality and 
poverty reduction.  A number of simulations of the impact of economic growth and 
inequality on poverty reduction are presented. In addition, the section focuses on the 
relationship between economic growth and measures of human development. The analysis 
shows that economic growth is important but not sufficient for many countries to achieve 
the Millennium Development Goals. It is demonstrated that overall human development 
requires both economic growth and reduction in inequalities.  Using simple analysis of data, 
we show that there are countries that have income levels necessary to achieve the human 
development targets but are not meeting these targets. Thus, these countries could do more 
in terms of positive economic rights. We refer these countries as being characterized by 
human development effort deficit.  On the other hand, many countries have low incomes and thus 
not able to meet development targets.  We refer these countries as having a human development 
income deficit.  It is argued that both income and effort deficits are the result of low emphasis 
on both negative and positive economic rights. Section III focuses on institutions and 
economic rights. The basic argument is that to improve the absolute quality of life, there is 
                                                 
1 Some explanations for the perverse outcomes include poor design and implementation and also the fact that 
policies just benefited some few sectors and hurt others. 
2 Although the paper is fairly general, it has a biased emphasis on African countries primarily because of their 
low human development record. 
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need for pro-poor policies and such policies are directly related to power relations in society. 
It is argued that pro-poor policies are implemented in societies where power is sufficiently 
diffused such that members of the society have significant leverage over the type of policies 
that are enacted.  Leverage permits citizens to hold leaders to account and also necessitates  
that different interests bargain with each other in the process of policy formulation. In 
essence, power diffusion results in a society where groups bargain with each other on 
matters of policy. Simply, in a society where power is diffused, policy outcomes are the result 
of compromise. The section provides some empirical evidence on the relationship between 
human development effort and institutions. Some recent cases where power diffusion has 
been associated with improvements in economic rights are discussed. Section IV concludes 
with some suggestions for institutional reforms to facilitate power diffusion and 
consequently improvements in economic rights. 
 2.0.       Economic Growth, Poverty Reduction and Overall Human Development 
2.1   Importance of Growth for Poverty Reduction 
We define pro-poor growth as economic expansion that associates with reductions in 
relevant measures of poverty.  More specifically, pro-poor growth is growth that associates 
with a high elasticity of the poverty rate to economic growth (Ravallion 2001).3 A more 
precise definition is one by Klasen (2001) who considers pro-poor growth to mean that the 
poor benefit disproportionately from economic growth.4 This essentially means that income 
growth by the poorest group exceeds the average growth rate. To a large extent, economic 
growth does in fact translate to reductions in poverty. But the same growth can result in 
                                                 
3 Growth elasticity of poverty ξ is computed as follows: ξ=(∆H/∆U* U/H) where H is the headcount index 
and U is the mean income. 
4 This is consistent to White and Anderson (2001) who define pro-poor growth as follows: (1) The poor’s share 
of incremental income exceeds their current share, (2) the poor’s share of incremental income exceeds their 
share of population; and (3) the poor’s share of incremental income exceeds some international norm. 
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different levels of poverty reduction in different countries. The sensitivity of poverty to 
growth varies across institutions and with the policies adopted to generate the growth. 
Cross-country evidence reveals that there are large variations in poverty reduction from the 
same growth rate. In other words, growth is more pro-poor in some countries than in 
others.5 
Clearly, a first priority in the war against poverty is achievement of economic growth. 
While the sensitivity of poverty reduction to economic growth may be low, evidence shows 
that growth is necessary for poverty reduction. To demonstrate the importance of growth to 
poverty reduction, we start by analyzing simple simulations based on coefficients obtained 
by Ravallion (2001). Ravallion investigates the relationship between growth and poverty and 
inequality using data from household surveys. The data are for 47 developing countries for 
two successive  surveys allowing measures in changes in poverty and income distribution.  
Ravallion finds growth elasticity of poverty equal to 2.5—meaning that a 1% increase in the 
mean income results in a reduction of the proportion of the population living below $1 day 
by an average of 2.5%.6 We use this growth elasticity of poverty reduction to stimulate 
expected poverty reduction in a few African countries—Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, 
Uganda and Zimbabwe.7  We first assume that the growth rates achieved in 2001 are 
maintained for the period up to the year 2015. We then simulate how poverty rates would 
change if the countries doubled the rates of growth over the same period. The results of the 
simulations are shown on Table 1.  
                                                 
5 Actually, as shown in Pasha and Palanivel (2004), different growth episodes in the same country can have 
different impacts on poverty reduction. That is, some episodes of growth can be more pro-poor than others. 
6 Simply, change in poverty is given by P = Pt – γ(g), where P= the poverty rate, γ is the growth elasticity of 
poverty reduction and g is the growth rate.  
7 These countries are selected purely for illustrative purposes. The countries are in a way representative of 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa  in terms of their income levels, inequality and growth experiences over the last 
few years.  Furthermore, the structure of the countries in terms of share of agricultural, minerals and industrial 
output are representative of many other African countries.  
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The growth elasticity of poverty reduction is assumed to be the same for all countries 
and constant over time.8  It is evident that, given the assumed growth elasticity of poverty 
reduction, poverty would fall consistently in all the countries. However, for the low growth 
rate countries (Kenya and Zimbabwe), poverty reduction would be relatively low. If Kenya’s 
rate of economic growth remained at 1.5%, the poverty rate would be 32% in 2015 having 
dropped from 56% in 2001. In Zimbabwe on the other hand, if the growth rate were to 
remain at 0.1%, then the poverty rate would be 67% in 2015, marginally dropping from the 
initial level of 70% in 2001.  On the other hand, a high growth country like Uganda would 
have the poverty rate fall from 35% to 4.41% over the same period.   The data also shows 
the impact of doubling economic growth on poverty reduction. For example, Kenya’s 
poverty rate would fall from 56% in 2001 to 18% in 2015 if an annual growth rate of 3% 
were to be achieved and sustained throughout the period. Simply, for Kenya to half its 
current poverty rate by 2015 from its 2001 levels, a much higher growth rate than has been 
realized over the last few years would be necessary. For Zimbabwe, achievement of the 
millennium development goals is almost out of reach unless there were to be a major change 
in economic performance. Uganda on the other hand seems well destined to meet its 
poverty reduction goals if it maintained the high rates of economic growth experienced over 
the last few years. The main point of this discussion and analysis is that growth is important 
for poverty reduction.  As such, when we are concerned about absolute well-being of the 
population, an emphasis on economic growth is crucial. 
2.2.  The Role of Inequality on Pro-Poor Growth 
                                                 
8 It is conceivable that the growth elasticity to poverty reduction decreases as poverty declines. When poverty is 
very high, increases in growth absorbs the easily employable poor who may have skills, etc. This suggests that 
high responsiveness of growth to poverty reduction. However, even with growth remaining poor may be 
increasingly more difficult to exploit the labor market meaning that the growth elasticity to poverty reduction 
declines. For a similar argument, see,  Kimenyi and Mbaku (1995). 
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The above discussion assumes that the growth elasticity of poverty reduction is independent 
of the state of income distribution. However, this is not exactly correct. Evidence shows that 
a country’s ability to reduce poverty is impacted by inequality in the distribution of income. 
It has been demonstrated that a high level of inequality can stifle prospects for pro-poor 
growth.  Ravallion has suggested the use of distribution-corrected rate of economic growth 
on average income to investigate the impact of inequality on poverty reduction.  The idea is 
that the initial level of inequality does impact on the responsiveness of poverty to economic 
growth. Borrowing coefficients obtained by Ravallion, we simulate the expected changes in 
poverty for Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe using the distribution 
corrected rate of economic growth.9  In Table 2, we compare the poverty expected in 2015 
when inequality is not taken into account (as in previous case) and when adjustments are 
made for the prevailing inequality.  The results show that high levels of inequality reduce the 
responsiveness of poverty reduction to economic growth. In all cases, inequality adjusted 
poverty rates are higher implying that inequality in the distribution of income reduces the 
responsiveness of poverty reduction to growth.  Note that the higher the inequality, the 
lower the reduction in poverty for a given rate of economic growth.10 
To demonstrate the importance of inequality on poverty reduction, we investigate 
how poverty rates would change if we assumed that inequality were half of their 2001 levels. 
In the case of Zimbabwe, we also assume a higher growth rate of 3% and also a reduction in 
inequality.11   The results are shown in Table 3. The results show the impact of growth on 
                                                 
9 The distribution-corrected rate of growth in average income is given by (1-Gini) ∆lnYt). Where Gini is the 
measure of inequality and Y is the income.  
10 A common argument against focusing on reducing inequalities relies on the Kuznets hypothesis. Kuzents  
(1955)observed that, at very low levels of income, there was a positive relationship between inequality and 
economic growth.  Thus reducing inequality would inhibit growth.  Recent evidence shows that the Kuznets 
hypothesis does not hold and actually reducing inequality is conducive to growth. 
11 Zimbabwe has had extremely low rates of economic growth over the last few years. This is primarily because 
of  political uncertainty and we do not expect such policies to be sustained for long due to political pressure 
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poverty reduction when inequality is lower. The results show that poverty in Zimbabwe 
would fall dramatically if both high rates of growth and reduction in inequality were achieved 
simultaneously.   In essence, the main story is that growth is good for poverty reduction. 
However, the effect of growth on poverty reduction is neutralized by high inequality. In 
other words, growth is a powerful vehicle to lower poverty but only when associated with 
decreases in inequality.12 
2.3.  Complementarity of Positive and Negative Economic Rights in Raising 
Absolute Quality of Life  
Economic growth results in increased levels of income over time. If in fact growth is key to 
improving the quality of life, then it would be expected that higher levels of income would 
associate with higher levels of human development. By and large, there seems to be universal 
acceptance that most developing countries can only achieve the MDGs through accelerated 
economic growth. Thus, it is assumed that increasing national incomes will be the primary 
way to achieve the MDGs. We suggest that the link between income and achievement of 
MDGs is not straight forward.  In other words, increases in national income does not 
guarantee achievement of MDGs. In fact, we suggest that hedging increases in income to 
achieve MDGs is likely to be futile. Instead, we argue that institutional reforms that allow for 
“pro-poor” growth is the key to achieving MDGs.  
We utilize the measures of human development prepared by the United Nations. For 
our purposes, we focus on the overall measure of human development—the Human 
Development Index (HDI) and also key components of human development including adult 
literacy, life expectancy, primary and secondary school enrollment, infant mortality and per 
                                                                                                                                                 
both within and from international community. We therefore assume that the country will change course and 
attain growth rates comparable to previous record.  
12 This is equivalent to growth with equity—signifying the fact that there is economic growth but at the same 
time reduction in inequality. 
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capita income.  The simple exercise is to compare how these measures relate to the per 
capita income. Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics of the measures of human 
development.  
Our interest is to investigate how these measures of human development vary with 
income. We estimate ordinary least squares regression of the measures of human 
development against the log per capita income. The results of the estimation are shown in 
Table 5.13  In all cases, higher levels of income associate with improvements in the measures 
of human development and the relevant coefficients are large.  This suggests that a policy for 
raising incomes is definitely important to achieving the MDGs.   But nevertheless, the results 
also tells us that there is much more than merely raising income levels to achieve human 
development. First, the adjusted coefficient of determination tells us that income alone 
explains only between 61 and 88 percent of the variations in the measures of human 
development.  In addition, the intercepts (constants) of the regression are fairly large.  
To expound on the importance of pro-poor growth, we examine the relationship 
between income and human development by plotting the various measures of human 
development against per capital income.  This is shown in Figures 1-4.  The plots show that 
there is a clear positive relationship between per capital income and measures of human 
development. As such, the idea that growth is necessary to achieve positive gains in human 
development is fairy obvious and thus supporting the claim that growth (meaning rising  
incomes) is good for the poor. 14  But that is only part of the story.  
Looking at Figure 1, we note that only very few countries with a  per capita income 
of $2,40015 or less  have a  HDI equal or above the mean (0.698).16  Most of the  countries in 
                                                 
13 We have excluded HDI because the computation of the index incorporates income. 
14 Data are for year 2002 as reported in the Human Development Report (2004). 
15 The income data are expressed in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP). 
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this income range have HDI values that are below the mean. In fact, a number of countries 
that have per capita incomes between $2,400 and $7,000 have HDI values that are just about 
equal or below the mean.  It is only after a per capita income of about $7,000 do we observe 
almost all countries scoring above the mean HDI.17 18  Suppose we were to target the 
achievement of the mean HDI by low-income countries.  One way to think about this is to 
consider a HDI of 0.69 as the minimum acceptable quality of life. If income were the 
primary determinant of HDI, then countries with less than a per capita income of $2,400 
would not be able to achieve the desired level of human development. Taking a per capita 
income of $2,400 as the minimum or threshold income necessary to achieve the target level 
of Human Development, we can then think of human development income deficit as the 
difference between the threshold income ($2,400) and a country’s actual per capita income.   
Figure 5 helps elaborate on the concept of human development income deficit as used in 
this paper. The straight line represents the mean HDI= 0.69. The line intersects the HDI 
line at approximately an income of $2,400.  We refer to countries with incomes below this 
threshold income as having a human development income deficit—measured by the distance 
between $2,400 and the country’s income. The relevant question then is if we were to rely on 
economic growth, how long would it take for poor countries to achieve the minimum 
acceptable quality of life (HDI=0.69)? 
                                                                                                                                                 
16  These are Vietnam with a per capita income of $ 2,300 and HDI of 0.691; Georgia with a per capita income 
of $2,260 and HDI 0.739; Uzbekistan  with a per capita income of $ 1,670 and HDI of 0.709 and  Tajikistan 
with a per capita income of $ 1,620 and HDI 0.701. Moldova is also very close with an income of $ 1,470 and 
HDI equal to 0.69. 
17 Note that some countries with per capita incomes above $7,000 have HDI values that are lower than the 
mean. These include: South Africa, Gabon, Namibia, Swaziland, Egypt, Morocco and India. Honduras and 
Nicaragua have HDI values that are just slightly below the mean. 
18 In fact, looking at all the measures of human development, this trend holds true. This means that to achieve 
the school enrollment goals and reduce infant mortality, the poor countries will have to at least double their 
incomes on average. Actually, for some measures of human development, higher incomes are necessary.  
 12 
Table 6 lists a number of African countries and their per capita incomes in 2002.19 If 
we assume that the countries must have at least $2,400 to meet the human development 
goals, then we can compute the time it would take for the countries to achieve the human 
development threshold income.  For illustration purposes, we assume rates of growth of —
1.5%, 3% and 4.5%.20 The data presented in the table reveals the painful truth about Africa’s 
prospects for improving the well-being of her people. It  is apparent that majority of African 
countries are unlikely to meet the Millennium Development Goals unless they were to 
sustain much higher rates of economic growth than has been the case in the recent past. 
Even if we assumed a high growth rate of 4.5%, many of the countries would still take over 
two decades to achieve the mean HDI.21 Given the past record of poor growth, one cannot 
be optimistic about these countries’ ability to achieve high growth rates than in the past 
unless there are major changes.  
It is important to note that while there seems to be a clear income threshold below 
which most countries do not achieve the mean HDI, there are also cases for which countries 
have significantly higher incomes and yet their HDI and other measures of human 
development fall much below the mean. These countries score low HDI but have incomes 
that are above the average threshold income.  In essence, these are countries that otherwise 
have been able to adopt pro-growth policies but are not achieving the human development 
targets.  We could consider these countries as failing in putting sufficient effort to achieve 
human development. In other words, the countries are characterized by human development 
                                                 
19 We have selected all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa whose per capita incomes fell below the threshold 
income in 2002. 
20 The idea is to compute the value of n given Yn= Yt(1+g)n where Yn is the minimum income to meet the 
human development goals, n is the number of years necessary to achieve Yn, Yt is the current income and g is 
the annual income growth rate.  
21 Note that we are only looking at achieving a HDI=0.69. If all countries improve on the levels of human 
development, then the mean HDI would naturally increase and this would mean much longer time for 
countries starting poor to achieve the new mean. In other words, a mean HDI is a moving target and for  our 
analysis we are therefore focusing on the value of 0.69 as an absolute value of HDI. 
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“effort deficit”. The point to emphasize is that there appears to be a minimum threshold 
income that is necessary to achieve at least the mean level of human development. However, 
there are many countries where high levels of income have not yielded the levels of human 
development that would be expected for those levels of income.  
Merely looking at the HDI value in relation to the per capita income may not reveal the 
entire story about the concept of human development effort deficit. Even though countries 
may be having an income deficit by our definition, it is possible that they are also 
characterized by human development effort deficit. This would be the case where a country  
could achieve higher scores of the measures of human development even with the low 
incomes. We have in fact noticed that there are some countries that actually have higher 
HDI scores though their incomes are lower than what we have considered as the threshold 
income. Thus, some poor countries could be characterized by both income deficit and effort 
deficit.  Likewise, just because countries have high incomes and values of HDI that are above 
the mean does not necessary imply that they do not have a human development effort 
deficit. Simply, it is possible that these countries could achieve higher levels of human 
development if they put more effort.  We can therefore classify countries into categories 
based on human development income and effort deficits. As will be apparent in the next 
section, the categorization is important in linking institutions and economic rights. 
We conduct simple analysis in order identify the categories to which different countries 
fall under. We estimate a simple regression of HDI against the log per capita income. 
However, we note that because HDI includes an income component, adjustments are 
necessary as to avoid biases.  In practice, HDI is an aggregation of one third of each of three 
components—life expectancy index, education index, and income index in equal weights. 
We therefore subtract one-third of income index from the HDI to obtain an adjusted 
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income-free HDI and then regress the log of adjusted HDI against log income.22 We then 
look at the predicted values and residuals of the regression.23 Positive residuals mean that the 
country’s HDI score is higher than predicted value.24 In other words, the country is doing 
better in terms of human development than expected given its level of income. On the other 
hand, negative residuals imply that the country is doing less in terms of human development 
than expected given its level of income. That is, negative residuals imply human development 
deficit.  Of course the magnitudes of the residuals suggest relative levels of effort. We then 
rank the countries based on the magnitude of the residuals.  Our rankings based on the 
residuals gives as the Human Development Effort rankings.  Table 7 shows the effort 
rankings compared to the HDI rankings.   
We also regress the HDI rankings against the per capita index and again obtain the 
predicted values and the residuals and rank the countries based on the magnitude of the 
residuals.   The income index captures a country’s ranking in terms of income while the 
human development index ranking captures the country’s ranking in terms of human 
development indicators. Since income is an important determinant of human development, 
we expect a negative relationship between the human development index ranking and the 
income index.25  The rankings again show the performance of the countries in terms of 
human development effort.  If the residuals are negative, then it means that the country is 
doing better than expected given its income ranking. That is, its predicted human developing 
                                                 
22 The results of the regression are:  
Log Adjusted HDI = -0.625        + 0.218 Log Per capita income 
                                 (-23.14)*** + (16.48)***  Adj. R-Squared= 0.611, t-statistics in parenthesis. 
23 Cingranelli and Richards (2004) present a similar but more comprehensive analysis focusing primarily on 
measuring governments respect for human rights using the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI).  While there 
are some similarities in the results, their analysis focuses mainly on measurement issues while the present paper 
emphasizes institutional dimensions of economic rights. 
24 Note predicted values are in natural logs hence the negative values. 
25 The results of the estimation are as follows:   
HDIRANK= 255.60        – 255.72  INCOME INDEX,  
                             (53.48)***    (-36.318)***  t-statistics in parenthesis;   Adjusted R-Squared= 0.885 
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ranking is lower  (suggesting better human development) than actual ranking. On the other 
hand, positive residual shows that the country is doing worse than expected, hence a human 
development deficit. Table 8 shows the country rankings in terms of human development 
effort based on the predicted values of HDI ranking.  
Both Tables 7 and 8 show that, some countries are achieving much better human 
development outcomes than others when we control for income.26 For example, Table 7 
shows that Tajikistan has the highest human development effort as shown by the difference 
between the adjusted HDI and the predicted adjusted HDI.  In essence, this country is doing 
very well given its income. On the other hand, virtually all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
are ranked lowest in terms of effort.  The effort deficit characteristic of these countries 
implies that they could achieve better human development outcomes given their resources if 
they were to put more effort.27 There are also a number of developed countries that are 
performing poorly in terms of human development effort.28  Although there are some 
                                                 
26 A cautionary remark is in order at this juncture.  This analysis looks at what levels of human development 
can possibly be achieved given a country’s income. Our human development effort variable is based on 
deviations from what is achievable given the level of income. There is a major assumption that countries are 
placing maximum effort in terms of generating income—which may not necessarily be the case. Thus care is 
required in interpreting the derived effort variable. In short, a country that have low incomes because the 
constrain economic freedom may core a reasonably high HDI score but could even do better if they were to 
improve on negative economic rights.  
27 Based on our analysis and the rankings reported in Tables 7 and 8, some of the worst African performers in 
terms of human development effort include some of the countries with reasonably good record of economic 
performance and also strong institutions such as Botswana and South Africa.   Both of these countries score 
much lower in terms of human development outcomes than would be expected considering their levels of 
income. In the case of South Africa, the deviation between actual and expected human development outcomes 
could be a result of the previous history. But the deviation could also be explained by other factors. One 
possible factor explaining the outcomes in these countries could be the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic.  
More detailed analysis is required to explain the apparent poor performance of these countries in terms of 
human development effort. 
28 For example, the United States of America ranks number eight in terms of HDI but it is ranked number 147 
(table 7) and 134 (Table 8) in terms of human development effort. This would suggest that U.S. could do better 
in improving the well-being of her people given the resources. For this study, we do not consider countries 
whose HDI is above the mean as effort deficit though they could achieve higher scores of human 
development.  The reason for this is that as HDI approaches the maximum, it becomes increasingly difficult to 
make improvements because there are aspects of human development that are beyond the control by standard 
policy instruments.  Likewise, additional effort can be counter-productive after some level as is the case in 
regard to the undesirable effects of welfare in advanced countries (see for example Kimenyi 1995 on US 
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noticeable differences in rankings based on the two approaches, there is a fair degree of 
consistency.  It is important to note that both approaches result in low human development 
effort rankings for most of the Sub-Saharan African countries. Thus, not only are these 
countries facing an income deficit, they also are characterized by human development effort 
deficit.29   
The foregoing discussion suggests that failure to raise the absolute quality of life is the 
result of weak emphasis on economic rights—both negative and positive.  The human 
development income deficit is to a large extent the outcome of low levels of economic 
freedom—primarily negative rights.  On the other hand, human development effort deficit is 
due to low emphasis on positive economic rights.  A country cannot raise the absolute 
quality of life for all citizens without providing conditions that are conducive to economic 
growth and wealth accumulation. Likewise, quality of life for the poorest members of society 
may remain low if there are no concrete efforts to provide social protection.  Thus, as far as 
absolute quality of life is concerned, both positive and negative economic rights are 
complementary rather than substitutes.30 
3.0.   Institutions and Economic Rights   
3.1.. Theoretical Underpinnings of Pro-Poor Institutions—the Power Diffusion 
principle 
So far the discussion has focused on the importance of economic growth to poverty 
reduction and overall human development.  One basic conclusion is that economic growth is 
                                                                                                                                                 
welfare policy and outcomes). Thus, although we have ranked all countries, our definition of human 
development effort deficit applies to those with HDI scores below the mean.  
29 Given the fact that many countries are characterized by human development effort deficit, the results 
provided in Table 6 concerning the time necessary for different countries to achieve the millennium 
development goals should be interpreted with care. Our assumption is that a certain level of income is 
necessary to achieve the MDGs. However, it is conceivable that the countries can achieve the income level but 
may not place sufficient emphasis to achieve the MDGs. 
30 See Blume and Voight (2004) for related analysis. 
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necessary for poverty reduction and overall human development.  To the extent that 
negative economic rights have impact on economic growth, they are pro-poor. Thus a focus 
on economic freedom as advocated by classical liberals is not inconsistent with advancement 
of human rights generally.  But as we have established in the previous section, economic 
growth is not sufficient for overall human development. There are many cases where 
countries have high incomes but this has not translated into significant reductions in poverty 
or general improvements in well-being. Thus, significant poverty reduction requires growth 
that distributes benefits to the poor and enlarges their opportunity set. 
As noted earlier, poverty reduction requires the implementation of policies for 
economic growth.  Economic growth implies the creation of value from a given set of 
resources. Standard key ingredients for growth include increases in investment, advances in 
technology, and improvements in the quality of the labor force through investments in 
human capital. At the core of achieving and sustaining economic growth is getting the 
fundamentals right—macroeconomic stability—inflation, interest rates, openness to trade 
and reducing the cost of doing business—infrastructure, incentives, etc. Simply, creation of 
value requires some key fundamentals for market actors to enter into gainful transactions.  
Thus, as a starting point, for countries to achieve economic growth, they must at least have 
the fundamentals in place.  This suggests paying attention to the elements of economic 
freedom.   
Good policies for economic growth may not necessarily result in pro-poor growth. 
As noted previously, some of the policies implemented by a host of developing countries 
have not always resulted in pro-poor growth.  However, it is has been widely demonstrated 
that macroeconomic stability is necessary for economic growth. For example, high inflation 
and large budget deficits undermine economic growth and hurt the poor disproportionately. 
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Likewise, an undervalued exchange rate policy reduces the volume of exports thereby 
worsening the balance of payment position which hurts the poor. More specific pro-poor 
growth policies include government spending on human capital investments, policies that  
target achieving equity in terms of asset ownership, gender and regions, etc.  Klasen (2001) 
provides a good summary of pro-poor growth policies (see Table 9 ).31 
While good policies are central to the achievement of economic growth, it is now 
well established that such growth requires some core quality institutions.  Economic growth 
arises from the interactions of good policies and good institutions. North (1990) for example 
elaborates on the role of institutions in providing the right economic incentives for capital 
accumulation.  Good policies alone are not sufficient to yield sustained growth and likewise 
good institutions cannot result in growth unless backed by good policies.  In essence, growth 
is the result of the interaction between policies and institutions. There is however feedback 
from policies to institutions and institutions to policies. In other words institutions and 
policies are to an extent interdependent, with good policies reinforcing institutions and vice 
versa.  Empirical literature has demonstrated a positive and significant relationship between 
the quality of institutions and economic growth (de Haan and Siermann 1995; Rodrik 1998; 
Nkurunziza and Bates 2003). In fact, evidence shows that some of the resource rich 
countries perform dismally in terms of economic growth because of institutional weaknesses. 
As matter of fact, many scholars now consider institutions to be more important to 
economic growth than natural resource endowments (North 1990; Keefer 2004; Olson 1993, 
1997; Kimenyi and Mbaku 1999; Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton 1999).  Probably the 
most important institutional factors include improving governance, protection of property 
rights and upholding the rule of law.   These institutional features are important for growth 
                                                 
31 For the purposes of this paper, we do not go into detailed analysis of the merits of the pro-poor policies but 
rather focus on institutions that result in the enactment of pro-poor growth policies.  Se also Timmer (2004). 
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generally. Our focus is more specifically on the institutions that are necessary for the 
adoption of pro-poor growth policies. In other words, what type of institutions are necessary 
for the adoption of pro-poor growth policies?32  
Based on the previous discussion, there are two key problems related to poverty 
reduction. The first has to do with the low growth and low incomes essentially resulting in 
what we have referred to as human development “income deficit”.  This income shortfall 
means that a country does not have the means to deal with poverty. The second problem 
concerns human development “effort deficit”. This is the case where a country has the 
necessary resources but policies are not geared to improving the well-being of the poor. We 
argue that both of these problems are directly related to institutions, and specifically the 
degree of leverage that the poor have in society. Pro-poor policies require that those in the 
bottom of the income distribution scale be in a position to effectively exert leverage on the 
leadership. We argue that public policy outcomes represent the interplay between various 
interests in the society and only those groups that are able to exert leverage are favored by 
the policies. This is consistent with the interest-group theory of government (Stigler 1971 
and Peltzman 1976). Pro-poor institutions are therefore those whereby the poor have power 
to influence policy outcomes in their favor. Such emerges when the poor are able to 
constrain the actions of the leaders and also bargain with other groups in society.  
As a basic starting point in our exploration of pro-poor institutions, we view policy 
makers and bureaucrats as primarily interested in maximizing their own welfare.33 Absent 
constraints, those in positions of power will seek to institute policies that best serve their 
                                                 
32 A number of studies have focused on links between human rights and institutions. See for example Blume 
and Voight (2004) and Howard and Donnely (1996).  
33 Viewing individuals as utility maximizers  both in the public and private spheres is a primary tenet of the 
theory of public choice.  The theory deviates from the traditional analysis of public policy by rejecting 
bifurcation of  human behavior (see Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). 
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interests. In essence, without institutional constraints, leaders will more often than not act in 
a predatory manner.34 Put in another way, the behavior of leaders largely depends on the 
principal-agent relationships in a society. These relationships are largely dependent on the 
institutional arrangements and the power distribution in society.  Thus adoption of good 
policies is not the result of “good” people but primarily because of “good” institutional 
constraints that limit the predatory nature of leaders.   But of course this may not fully 
explain the two outcomes observed—“human development income deficit” and the “human 
development effort deficit”. We suggest that these outcomes represent institutional failures. 
Specifically, both outcomes are related to inefficient “banditary.”  
Leaders can be considered as bandits who extract rents from producers for their own 
benefit. A distinction is made between roving banditary and stationary banditary. Roving 
bandits are those that move from place to place stealing output from producers. This was 
the case in China during the 1920s where bandits moved from village to village ravaging the 
villagers, killing them and stealing their outputs.35 For roving bandits, the future output is of 
no concern since they move on to other villages after destroying the productive assets in one 
village. Under a roving banditary regime, there is no incentive to encourage higher outputs 
nor do the bandits invest in key productive activities such as infrastructure. That is, they do 
not invest in productive public goods.  Roving bandits face few constraints and seek no 
consensus from the population from whom they extract from.  One could view such bandits 
as having a very short planning horizon and their interest is therefore to extract as much as 
they can and then move on.  Societies subjected to the rule of roving banditary are likely to 
                                                 
34 It is important that institutional constraints on the behavior of leaders and members of society come from 
many sources. For example, at one level, such constraints could be through a formal constitution that limits the 
actions of leaders. However, constraints could also be more informal ranging form customs to actions based on 
reciprocity and trust.   
35 This analysis follows Olson (1997). 
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be characterized by low growth, limited investment in productivity-enhancing infrastructure 
and generally low human development.  Under a roving baditary regime, power is wholly 
concentrated with the band of bandits.  
On the other hand, stationary bandits are those bandits that actually settle in a 
particular area but  still extract rents from the population. There is a major difference 
however between roving and stationary bandits—the stationary bandits do have an interest 
in the level of output and in fact the future productivity of the community. This is because 
the welfare of the bandits is directly related to the output of the community. As such, 
stationary bandits, while not democratic as such, have an interest in promoting production—
economic growth so to say.  Stationary bandits therefore limit their extractive activities so as 
not to adversely affect levels of output. Likewise, the stationary banditary regime invests in 
productive activities such as infrastructure, thereby resulting in economic growth. Notice 
that, because the bandits are basically interested in maximizing what they can extract, they 
would have no incentive to share the extractable output with the poor. In other words, 
under a stationary banditary regime, there is no incentive to focus on improvement of the 
poor generally. However, the bandits would be keen on supporting producers and providing 
necessary protection. Thus, stationary bandits are captured by a few interest groups that 
benefit from the regime and also constrain the regime from transferring benefits to other 
members of the society.  
The alternative to banditary regimes is establishment of institutions through 
participatory governance or by consent. In such institutions, the leaders (bandits) can only 
establish rule over the polity by seeking consensus involving widespread participation by the 
members of the relevant society. This implies that decision making powers are not held by 
the bandits and a few interest groups alone but are widely diffused in the society.  In such 
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consensual societies, economic growth and the well-being of all the citizens is directly related 
to the survival of the regime. While the leadership in such as society is necessarily influenced 
more by some interest groups than others, the well-being of all groups is important and must 
be addressed by such regimes.  Because power is sufficiently diffused in the society to 
different groups (businesses, non-profit organizations, labor unions, producer groups, poor 
and  wealthy, etc), both economic growth that improves the well-being of all members of the 
society and also pro-poor growth that specifically improves the well being of the poor 
disproportionately are part of the leadership’s utility function.36 
Table 10, which is an extension of Figure 5 and also Tables 7 and 8, attempts to 
provide a schema for analyzing human development and institutions by categorizing  
countries based on the income and level of human development. The middle line represents 
the mean HDI and vertical line Y* is the threshold human development income.  Box A 
represents countries with low incomes but high HDI. Based on the actual data of human 
development indicators, only a few countries are in this category.37 Box B represents human 
development income deficit countries. These low income countries can be considered as 
similar to “Roving Bandit” regimes. However, one set of these countries is also characterized 
by human development effort deficit while others are not. This means that there are 
differences in the nature of institutions within the roving banditary category.38 Box D on the 
other hand represents Human Development effort deficit countries. These are countries that 
are able to generate incomes but are not pro-poor. We argue that these countries are similar 
                                                 
36 The fact that power is sufficiently diffused implies that none of the groups including the leaders has a 
monopoly in determining outcomes. As such, policy outcomes require compromise through a process of 
bargaining. 
37 Many countries in this category are primarily part of the old Soviet block. Thus, how we interpret the results 
and consequential policy recommendations should take cognizance of the history of these states. Nevertheless, 
as evidence from Table 7 shows, there are many good performers that do not have history of socialism. 
38 This should not be surprising as countries have different histories. Furthermore, there is ample evidence 
showing that dictators are not created equal—some are more responsive to human development goals than 
others.  
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to “stationary bandits” regimes.  These are countries where leadership is captured by some 
producer and business interests. Box C represents countries whose incomes are above the 
threshold level and also have human development index above the mean--this is the case of 
consensual governments with sufficient power diffusion. It is important to note that some of 
the developing countries fall in this category.  Examples of countries falling under each of 
the categories are shown in  Table 10. 
The complementarily of positive and negative rights in raising absolute quality of life 
is apparent.  We have noted that only very few countries with low incomes have HDI values 
above the mean and these countries have a unique socialist history.  For countries in Box B, 
regardless of their human development effort, the absolute quality of life is low because of 
low incomes.  These countries are probably putting too much emphasis on redistribution 
(positive rights) and less on production (economic freedom).  On the other hand, countries 
in Box C have an emphasis on economic freedom and low effort on positive economic 
rights.39 
3.2. Historical and other Evidence of the Power-Diffusion Principle 
Historically, the emergence of institutions with centralized leadership often start with a high 
concentration of power amongst a few individuals who comprise of a ruling class. In many 
cases, this ruling class has been royal families or a group of families that monopolize power. 
In other cases, power has been concentrated amongst landed class and military juntas or 
even with religious leadership. For so long as power is concentrated with a few individuals, 
public policy outcomes can be expected to favor the group that holds the power. 
Furthermore, the group that holds power has no interest in enlarging its membership since 
                                                 
39 Even those who advocate for free markets with minimal intervention agree that economic growth requires 
public involvement in human capital (education, health, nutrition, etc.).  Thus sustaining high rates of economic 
growth is unlikely to be sustained in countries that do not invest heavily in human capital.  Countries in Box D 
are unlikely sustain growth unless they focus more on human capital—meaning emphasis on positive rights. 
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that would dilute the benefits to each member.  In terms of economic growth, it does not 
matter which group has the power: for so long as power is concentrated, the ruling coalition 
has no interest in broad pro-growth policies that would benefit all members of the society 
and therefore largely act as roving bandits. Absent means by which other groups can share in 
the power, those outside the ruling coalition continuously seek ways to replace the ruling 
coalition and establish themselves as rulers and in turn monopolize power. Such change in 
the ruling coalition is not through bargaining but rather through use of violence.  It is the 
uncertainty associated with roving banditary regimes that translates into the short-run 
planning horizon which is not consistent to economic growth.40  Economic growth is further 
undermined by the fact that such regimes have necessarily to invest substantial resources to 
prevent the formation of strong groups that could otherwise dislodge the regime. At the 
same time, the regime does not invest in productive public goods whose returns are realized 
long into the future. This explains the low-income high-concentration of power 
characteristic of countries in Box B. 
For many other countries, rulers form coalitions with powerful interest groups. 
These interest groups could be involved in agriculture, extraction of minerals or industrial 
production but the groups have an interest in supporting the regime in return for protection.  
On the other hand, the ruling class benefits by selling protection in return for revenue. In 
essence, such countries do in fact achieve growth and accumulation of wealth but there are 
no forces to redistribute wealth. In fact, the compact between rulers and producer interest 
groups is precisely based on implicit or explicit agreement that involves limiting 
redistribution. This may involve protection of land ownership, unfavorable labor laws, and 
                                                 
40 For a systematic analysis of behavior of rulers in roving bandits regimes, see, Brough and Kimenyi, 1986.  
This is also consistent to the findings by Alesina and Perotti (1996) who find that political instability, by 
creating uncertainty in the political economy environment, reduces investment. See also Dutt and Mitra (2004). 
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the erection of barriers to entry that makes it difficult for other producers to compete with 
incumbents.  It has been demonstrated that powerful interest groups can be harmful to 
growth by for example blocking adoption of new technologies.  For example, dominant 
industry groups can block the introduction of new technology by other firms. If the 
incumbent firms have captured the rulers, then it is conceivable that entrants will be blocked 
from entering and thus hindering growth.41  But rulers only adopt such policies if the 
increased competition in the market associates with loss of power. Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2000) propose a what they call the ‘political loser hypothesis’ and argue that it is those 
whose political power, not economic rents, are eroded that block technological progress. A 
lot of the countries in Box D (human development effort deficit) are in this category.  Good 
examples include South Africa where the state protected members of a producer group but 
limited the distribution of resources to other groups42 and the oil rich Arab countries  where 
power remains concentrated with a royal families. 
The basic argument advanced in this paper is that pro-poor growth policies requires 
power diffusion in society.  Institutions where power is sufficiently diffused are characterized 
by a “balance of power” amongst the various interest groups (Powelson 1994). This means 
that each of the groups in society has some degree of ‘veto power’ over public policy 
outcomes. For groups to be able to influence policy outcomes, they must have leverage—
that is they must be able to block adoption of policies. While individual groups may not 
necessarily be able to block all policies which do not benefit them, it is acknowledged that it 
is necessary to bargain with the groups in exchange of supporting other policies. Such 
                                                 
41 See for example Parente and Prescott (1999), “Monopoly Rights: A Barrier to Riches,”  Krusell and Rios-Rull 
(1996), “Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of Stagnation an Growth.” 
42 While there is now more power diffusion in South Africa, the effects of the Apartheid regime remains strong 
and little change has taken place in terms of economic benefits reaching the poor. While many pro-poor 
growth policies have been implemented, it will take time to undo the results of the past particularly when the 
target is growth with redistribution.  
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bargaining eliminates outcomes that completely ignore the welfare of some groups.  In 
essence, power diffusion results in a situation where policies are the outcome of 
compromise.  
Looking again at Table 10, we note that countries in Box B could make a transition  
either to Box D or Box C. A transition from B to D would mean that the countries achieve 
growth but policies so adopted are not pro-poor. Of course this would be a better transition 
rather than remaining in B but nevertheless such a transition would primarily benefit only 
some groups. Countries in Box D can also move to C implying focus on pro-poor policies.  
As demonstrated above, pro-poor growth policies only emerge when power is diffused.  
Lessons from history show that power diffusion takes place over long periods of 
time but involves increasingly the empowerment of groups formerly excluded from decision 
making in the society.  Even for today’s advanced nations, power was initially  concentrated 
but eventually diffused even to the peasants who were able to organize and demand better 
work conditions and wages. Through exerting leverage, those in power slowly but surely 
were forced to extend the franchise.  Powelson for example writes in the case of 
Northwestern Europe: 
From the ninth to the nineteenth century, power in Europe not only became 
more diffuse but also changed its character. At first, it belonged to 
individuals as a property right. Power positions were inherited, bought and 
sold, or granted by the monarch. They were based on military force, religion, 
and wealth.  Toward the end of the period, power belonged more to 
organizations—such as senate, business corporation, or labor union, than to 
individuals. It was grounded on institutions supported by a balance of 
tensions among groups…(page. 43-44). 
 
A significant factor in the power diffusion process is democratization—which 
typically starts with the extension of voting rights and meaningful participation in the 
political process.  By and large, diffusion of power occurs when groups outside the ruling 
coalition are well organised and form alliances that pose a threat to the ruling coalition.  In 
 27 
analysis of the case of Western Europe, Acemoglu and Robinson (1999) demonstrate that 
the ruling coalition extended the franchise to avoid social unrest and revolution and that 
these political reforms also culminated in what we may all pro-poor policies: 
 Britain, for example, was transformed from an ‘oligarchy’ run by an elite to a 
democracy. The franchise was extended in 1832, then again in 1867 and 
1884, transferring voting rights to portions of the society with no previous 
political representation. The decades after the political reforms witnessed 
radical social reforms, increased taxation, and extension of education to 
masses (p.1).43  
 
This story is consistent with what happened in many of today’s developed countries. 
In all cases, diffusion of power involved the emergence of many interest groups which 
formed vertical and horizontal alliances hence increasing their leverage.44  Important to note 
is that power diffusion was accompanied with not just growth, but growth with 
redistribution. 
For today’s poor countries, power diffusion is the primary strategy for  achieving 
pro-poor growth.  Evidence from a number of countries has shown that as different groups 
have become more organized and exerted pressure on the rulers, they have been able to 
force diffusion of power and consequently adoption of pro-poor growth policies.   But 
power diffusion is not evidenced by mere participation in voting process but rather by the 
formation of common-interest groups that have capacity to negotiate with others and 
collectively, these groups exert sufficient leverage (or provide credible threat to a regime). 
Pernia observes: 
                                                 
43 See also Acemoglu and Robinson (2002).  
44 The case of the United States in relationship to the well-being of blacks is particularly informative. Before the 
extension of voting rights, the well-being of blacks was not taken seriously by the leadership. Because the 
blacks did not have power to influence outcomes, there was limited focus on key development aspects such as 
education and health or even the working conditions. This of course changed dramatically as blacks became 
more organized and were able to exert leverage during the 1950s and 1960s culminating in the civil rights 
legislation and subsequent transfer and other programs that benefited them substantially. It is also important to 
note that blacks did not achieve such leverage on their own alone but by forming alliances with other groups. 
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Governments are prone to lobbying by special interest groups. The political 
feasibility of poverty reduction depends on the distribution of benefits from 
anti-poverty interventions, which in turn hinges on the prevailing 
configuration of pressure groups, such as industrialists, landlords, labor 
unions, peasant movements, consumer associations, and women’s groups. 
The potential for poverty reduction is better where there are strong coalitions 
of the poor that can pressure governments to act in their favor. Salient 
examples include the successful land reforms in the Republic of Korea and 
Taipei, China, on the one hand; and the slow, largely ineffective agrarian 
reforms in Pakistan and the Philippines, on the other……By contrast, 
coalitions of the rural poor and civil society organizations have in recent 
years managed to bring poverty to the top of the government’s agenda in 
Thailand (p.2-3). 
 
Thus, evidence from history and also contemporary cases confirm the importance of 
power diffusion on the adoption of pro-poor policies. At the core of the emergence of 
institutions where power is diffused is the formation of well-organized interest groups. A 
primary prerequisite for formation of groups is of course a political environment that is 
democratic and allows for freedom of association.  To a large extent, the evolution of 
common interest groups in Africa and other countries has been stunted by the autocratic 
regimes. We can therefore explain the over-representation of human development deficit 
African countries in Box B in Table 10—which we have called roving bandit regimes—as 
the result of suppression of political rights. Historical evidence shows that power diffusion 
was actually occurring albeit slowly long before colonialism, but this process was interrupted 
and distorted by colonial rule. Colonial rule and the post-colonial regimes that followed had 
the effect of concentrating power. Recent democratization efforts have also been associated 
with the emergence of numerous interest groups and civil society organizations and we can 
predict that these groups will act to force power diffusion, a process that is already evident. 
Note that power diffusion only occurs where many groups form, each with some substantial  
bargaining power, and thus prevents the domination by one or a few groups that can 
otherwise capture the political power. 
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Power diffusion therefore associates with quality institutions that are consistent to 
the adoption of pro-growth policies generally and also pro-poor policies specifically. But the 
emergence of well-organized interest groups depends on particular societies. Of key 
importance is the extent of trust amongst members of a group. Trust is necessary for people 
to form strong cohesive groups that are capable of advancing a common purpose. But even 
more important is that different groups must trust and cooperate in order to form horizontal 
and vertical alliances that are necessary to impart leverage on those who may seek to 
monopolize power.  Trust is one key component of social capital that influences power 
diffusion. Ethnic divisions are considered a key factor that reduce trust in Africa and thereby 
undermine the formation of effective civil society groups. 
 
3.3. Institutions That Facilitate Power Diffusion-Evidence  
 
At least since the late 1990s, there has been concerted emphasis on pro-poor growth. 
Noteworthy is the almost complete reversal from the exclusive focus on “trickle down” 
policies that characterized policy prescription during the 1980s and 1990s.  There are many  
studies that have evaluated pro-poor growth policies and their impacts in various countries. 
One general conclusion from these studies is that creating conducive environment for 
economic growth is pivotal to raising the welfare of the poor. Nevertheless, the studies do 
affirm the fact that economic growth alone without deliberate policies that improve the 
capabilities of the poor cannot improve the well being of the poor. In other words, the 
studies support the general thrust of this paper that economic growth alone is not sufficient 
to significantly lower poverty.  In addition, the studies show that reduction in inequalities is 
key to achievement of pro-poor growth.  
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 There is also an increasing body of empirical literature on the link between 
institutions and economic growth and poverty reduction.  The emerging consensus is that 
reforms that improve the institutions of governance, reduce corruption and increase 
transparency and enhance the participation of the poor, generally translate in improved 
economic performance and with the poor benefiting from the growth substantially. For 
example,  
An improvement in governance—such as an improvement in the rule of law 
from the low level in Russia to the high level in Czech Republic, or a reduction 
in corruption from the high level in Indonesia to that in the Republic of Korea-
leads to a two-to-four fold improvement in per capita incomes and in infant 
mortality rates, and about a 20 percent improvement in adult literacy.  These 
results are not just simple correlations between better governance and better 
development outcomes. Rather, the causality is from governance to these 
selected measures of development.45  
 
We now turn to investigating some of the key institutional features that relate to 
power diffusion and therefore pro-poor growth. The foregoing discussion has highlighted 
the main aspects of institution in relation to pro-poor growth which is diffusion of decision 
making powers to all members of the society including the poor. This essentially implies the 
empowerment of the people and is reflected in terms of their scope of participation in all 
aspects of life—social, economic and political. There are a number of indicators of 
institutional quality and which are good proxies for empowerment and power diffusion in 
general. These institutional features include democratization, prevalence of corruption, 
freedom of press and political stability.  These measures of quality of institutions capture the 
degree to which societies are open in terms of participation in decision making and the 
ability of citizens to hold leaders to account. Thus, high levels of corruption suggest that 
there are weak mechanisms to control the predatory activities of leaders.  On the other hand, 
                                                 
45 Global Solidarity, p.2, Box 3.1. See also Rodrik 1998, 1999; Mauro, 1995, 1998. 
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high levels of democratization and press freedom imply that the citizens are able to 
participate in policy making and have freedom to express their opinions.  As noted 
previously, political instability implies situations where barriers to political competition exist 
often resulting in violence which undermines growth.  In addition, the degree of inequality in 
society is an important institutional variable measuring the concentration of economic 
power.46 This can be considered as a proxy of the marginalization of low-income population.  
 We investigate the relevance of these institutional measures in explaining the well 
being of the poor.  It has already been demonstrated that income is a primary determinant of 
the well being of the members of a society and in fact is key to poverty reduction. But we 
have also argued that institutions do matter in far as the well being of the poor is concerned.  
It has been emphasized that both income deficit and human development effort deficit are the 
result of institution weaknesses.  To investigate the role of institutions in explaining a 
country’s pro-poor stance, we start by estimating the relationship between the value of the 
adjusted human development index and the per capita income as was done previously and 
obtain the predicted values of the  adjusted human development index PAHDI.  We then 
regress PAHDI against institutional variables. Simply, using predicted values of AHDI 
removes the variations due to income and thus we are able to determine the independent 
effects of institutional variables.  We estimate regression equations of the following general 
form: 
PAHDI = f (DEMOCRACY RANK, CORRUPTION RANK, PRESS 
FREEDOM RANK, POLITICAL INSTABILITY INDEX, INEQUALITY 
INDEX) 
                                                 
46 Inequality can be the result of institutions—which would suggest that the gini index is highly correlated 
to institutional measures—hence possible biases.  However, this does not appear to be a serious problem in 
the estimation.  Inclusion of the gini index does not impact on other institutional variables in terms of sign 
ad significance.   
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Increasing values of the rank of democracy, corruption, press freedom, imply that 
the countries are less democratic, more corrupt and have less freedom of the press. Likewise, 
higher values of the political instability index imply more instability while the larger the  
value of the inequality index the higher the inequality. If our theoretical analysis has 
empirical validity, then we expect a negative relationship between the measures of the quality 
of institutions and the predicted AHDI. Simply, countries that are less democratic, more 
corrupt, limit the freedom of expression, are characterized by political instability and have 
high levels of inequality in the distribution of income can be expected to have lower values 
of predicted HDI suggesting that they are less pro-poor.  The regression results are 
shown in Table 11.  In all cases, the results are as hypothesized with all the institutional 
variables having the expected signs.47 In addition the variables are significant to at least 10 
percent level of confidence.  These results are consistent to those of other researchers who 
have investigated the impact of institutions on economic growth and poverty reduction.  
These results suggest some obvious institutional reforms for the achievement of pro-
poor growth. First, of course is the establishment of more open political markets—that is 
introduction of political competition. Increased democracy as we have seen is at the core of 
the power diffusion process. Increased democracy can be expected to also reduce political 
instability and associated violence and civil wars. Second, fighting corruption is pivotal in 
power diffusion and requires there to be clear mechanisms through which the citizens can 
hold the leaders to account. Thus, democratization should not just mean opening markets 
for political competition and extending people’s freedoms but should also be associated with 
institutional reforms that constrain those in power. This calls for adoption of constitutional 
rules that limit the powers of rulers and also strengthens the judiciary and other organs 
                                                 
47 Democracy and press freedom are highly correlated and we have therefore not included both variables in the 
same specifications. 
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charged with fighting corruption.  Finally, our results suggest that inequality in the 
distribution of income is itself a barrier to the adoption of pro-poor policies.48 The policy 
prescription must therefore involve institutional arrangements that increase the participation 
of the poor in all aspects of life. In particular, policies that directly target benefits to the poor 
such as public expenditures on education, primary health care and rural infrastructure  
expand the opportunity set available to the poor and empower them economically.  One area 
that can advance the position of the poor in Africa is in land reform---including ownership  
and user rights.  Such reforms can be expected to empower the poor generally and 
specifically rural women who face various forms of marginalization. Appropriate land 
reforms initiatives can also be expected to provide incentives for improved productivity.  
Likewise, access to finance is important in reducing inequalities and empowering the poor. 
All these policies improve the capabilities of the poor and directly facilitate power diffusion 
and pro-poor growth. 
There are specific institutional arrangements that facilitate power diffusion.  A most 
important institution is decentralization.  In fact the rapid development of Western Europe 
and in particular the advent of the industrial revolution seems to have been possible because 
of competition amongst jurisdictions, which was not the case in other countries such as 
China and India.  Before the advent of the industrial revolution, the technical preconditions 
had certainly appeared excellent for an industrial revolution in Tang and Sung dynasty China 
between 7th and 12th centuries. Likewise, India had the artisans and thinkers who had skills 
and knowledge far superior to that of the Europeans. However, industrial revolution 
                                                 
48 It is acknowledged that inequality in the distribution of income is itself an outcome of the absence of pro-
poor policies.  We argue that inequality further perpetuates anti-poor policies as the poor are marginalized and 
are not able to influence policies.  
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occurred in Europe primarily because competition amongst jurisdictions that resulted in 
diffusion of power: 
 European and Asian rulers had probably been equally arbitrary and 
opportunistic, with little interest in the material welfare of their ordinary 
subjects. Unlike the large Asian empires, however, the European fiefdoms 
were small and open.  Enterprises, bankers, merchants and artisans were thus 
able to “vote with their feet”, if they felt poorly treated in a particular 
jurisdiction. 49  
 
The effect was competition by the rulers through establishment of the rule of law—
protection or property rights, autonomy to make contracts, and the protection of religious 
and civil liberties.  In essence, jurisdictional competition helped in the diffusion of power, 
facilitating economic growth and improvement of the well-being of all the people.  Similar 
power diffusion forces were not apparent in China and India and so arbitrary rule was 
sustained for centuries.   
Decentralization is an effective institutional reform for accelerating the diffusion of 
power and facilitating the adoption of pro-poor growth policies. As an organizing principle, 
decentralization brings the government closer to the people and empowers the polity so that 
they are able to hold those in positions of leadership accountable.  Bringing the government 
closer to the people essentially implies that they participate more in the design of policies 
and programs through exercising voice.  Local governments are in turn more likely to be 
responsive and therefore design public policies that are in line with local preferences 
(Kimenyi and Meagher 2004; Ferro, Rosenblatt and Stern 2002).  This is particularly 
important for large and diverse nations as is the case for many African countries.  In essence, 
decentralization results in power diffusion and thus provides even poor people with leverage.   
Today, many developing countries have embarked on decentralization which has led to the 
                                                 
49 Economic Growth and Institutions, pg. 13. 
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evolution of institutions that constrain political power and empower the citizens.50 Such 
decentralized institutions can be expected to be more pro-poor (Gaiha 2001). 
While evidence is mixed, there is ample evidence that shows that well designed 
decentralization schemes are pro-poor. This has been the case for several African countries 
such as Uganda and Burkina Faso (Birungi at al. 2000, Donnelly, et. Al 2001). The evidence 
shows that by empowering the local population, decentralization results in increased 
participation and improves public service delivery to the poor.51 
  
3.4. Recent Cases of Power Diffusion and Impact on Economic Rights 
During the last two decades, power diffusion has accelerated in many developing countries. 
This has involved a shift away from autocratic rule to semi-autocracy and even consensual 
governments. While in fact the changes in the quality of life occur over long periods and 
thus lag institutional changes, there are some good examples of advancement of economic 
rights as a result of power diffusion. Although a great deal of focus has been on positive 
rights, many of these countries have actually made advances in negative economic rights.   A 
number of countries have gone beyond legislating  economic rights and have included such 
rights in their constitutions.   
 Kenya represents an interesting case of the impact of power diffusion on economic 
rights.  Since independence in 1963, Kenya has been characterized by large inequalities and 
high concentration of power on the executive and a few members of a ruling coalition.  
Democratization efforts culminated in the election of a democratic coalition government in 
December 2002.  By January 2003, the new government announced and actually 
                                                 
50 For recent case studies of decentralization in developing and transitional economies, see Kimenyi and 
Meagher, 2004.  
51 Studies on decentralization in a number of West African countries show that decentralization has not yielded 
the results expected primarily because of poor design. See Korzun and Meager (2004). 
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implemented a policy of free and compulsory primary education among other measures to 
provide access to development goods to the majority of the population who had hitherto 
been marginalized.  The country’s proposed constitution that has been formulated through 
broad consultations includes various provisions on positive economic rights such as the right 
to social security, primary education, basic health care, etc.52  
 Uganda is another case study where dramatic changes in advancing economic rights 
have taken place.  While the current regime is not fully democratic, it represents major 
improvements in power diffusion from previous regimes.  The government of Uganda has 
undertaken major steps in social provision particularly in areas of education and health. 
Through decentralization initiatives, the government has been able to improve on human 
development.  Most significant has been adoption of pro-growth and pro-poor policies that 
have resulted in significant reductions in poverty. 
 South Africa is yet another good case of power diffusion.  As noted previously, 
South Africa is a high income country but one with a poor record of human development.  
The Apartheid regime focused on interests of whites but repressed blacks’ economic 
rights—both positive and negative.  Since the end of the apartheid era, major advances have 
been made in areas of redistributive justice particularly in the provision of education, basic 
health and housing.  While the quality of life for most black South Africans remains 
relatively low, there is clear evidence of advances associated with power diffusion.  In 
addition, the post apartheid constitution provides for specific rights in pertaining to positive 
economic rights (Sacks (  ); Porter 1995). 
                                                 
52 The proposed constitution is not adopted as yet and is scheduled for a referendum on November 21, 2005. 
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 The advancement in economic rights following power diffusion as discussed above  
is consistent to our previous analysis that suggested that such diffusion of power result in 
compromise amongst members of society. As noted by Pieterse and Van Donk (2004): 
The realisation of socio-economic rights is an inherently political process, 
which needs to involve rights-holders (directly, or through associations and 
organisations representing their interests) in determining the desired 
outcomes, objectives, strategies and acceptable trade-offs so that they are 
enabled to take control of their own destinies. This inevitably implies a 
political process of negotiation, disagreement, conflict, occasionally 
consensus, and, at a minimum, forms of mutual accommodation (p.3). 
 Increasingly, countries are including social and economic rights in their constitutions.  
This appears to be a direct approach to advancing the rights (Napier 2003; Porter 1995).  
However, this is issue is hotly debated to the extent that many such rights are considered 
unenforceable (Harvey 2004; Sunstein 2003).  The American constitution for example does 
not deal with social and economic rights.  On the other hand, many scholars consider 
inclusion of such rights in the constitution as paramount: 
Ultimately, a constitution which excludes social and economic rights betrays 
its own principles. It fails to safeguard the rights of disadvantaged groups and 
undermines the integrity of the democratic process. As the Indian Supreme 
Court said on one occasion, social and economic rights, and civil and 
political rights are like "two wheels of a chariot". Vulnerable minorities are 
no less in need of protection in the social and economic sphere than in the 
civil and political realm. An incomplete set of rights, a chariot missing a 
wheel, cannot help but veer off course. Now, more than ever, we need 
participatory democracies which hear the voices of their most disadvantaged 
citizens and address the injustice of social and economic deprivation as issues 
of fundamental human rights (Porter, 1995, pp. 4). 
 
What is apparent is that recent constitutional reforms in developing countries have 
tended to include social and economic rights. This is true for the African countries that have 
recently experienced diffusion of power. Thus while they may not have made many other 
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institutional reforms, these countries have opted for a more direct route to achieve economic 
rights. 
4.0. Conclusion: Institutional Reforms and Areas of Research 
This paper has highlighted the strong link between institutions and pro-poor growth. It has 
been demonstrated that, while growth is generally good for all members of the society, it is 
not sufficient for poverty reduction.  It has also been demonstrated that poverty responds to 
growth but the responsiveness does vary with the inequality.  In addition, it has been shown 
that while increasing incomes is necessary for the overall improvement of human well-being, 
there are cases when high incomes associate with low human development implying that 
benefits of growth do not filter down to the poor as would be expected.  The basic argument 
advanced in the paper is that institutions that support pro-poor growth are those where 
power is sufficiently diffused in society and where balance of power is maintained through 
bargaining and compromise amongst interest groups. This then requires democratic societies 
where many interest groups play a role in the design and implementation of policies. A 
particular innovation of this paper is the introduction of “human development income deficit” 
and “human development effort deficit” concepts to categorize countries.  This categorization 
helps us understand some of the constraints to pro-poor growth and also the transitions that 
the countries are likely to make depending on their institutional features.   The paper links 
institutions to human development effort deficit and confirms the importance of institutions 
in determining countries’ propensity to take pro-poor stance.  The paper also highlights the 
complementarity between positive and negative economic rights.  
 The emerging policy recommendations relate to institutional reforms to accelerate 
power diffusion including democratization and improvement in transparency. Likewise, well-
designed decentralization schemes are key to accelerating the power diffusion process and 
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consequently adoption of pro-poor policies.  While it is acknowledged that appropriate 
reforms should depend on a country’s unique circumstances, a primary message of the paper 
is that pro-poor reforms must entail diffusion of power even to the poorest members of 
society such that they participate meaningfully in determining policy outcomes including 
exercising leverage over the leadership.  
 A recurring theme in the paper is that large inequalities in the distribution of income 
are not only anti-poor in general but are also anti-growth.  In fact, it has been argued that, 
unless African countries focus on direct approaches to lower inequalities, achievement of the 
millennium development goals will remain a mirage.  Thus, key to achievement of pro-poor 
growth is a focus on targeting public expenditure on the poor in areas that directly increase 
their capabilities such as in education, health, land rights and rural infrastructure.  These pro-
poor expenditures can be expected to pay handsome dividends in terms of economic 
growth. However, we note that the adoption of such policies require that the poor be able to 
influence outcomes in their favor—thus emphasizing the necessity of reforms that accelerate 
power diffusion.  
 This paper is largely exploratory and more research is required so as to offer concrete 
reform proposals. More rigorous empirical investigation of the role of African institutions in 
power diffusion and pro-poor growth is necessary. In particular, there is need to focus on 
various institutional factors that seem to hinder power diffusion within the African context.  
A more careful analysis of human development effort deficit in relation to institutional 
arrangements can help unearth the most important institutional determinants of pro-poor 
growth and policies. More research is also necessary in evaluating the design of 
decentralization in Africa. While in theory decentralization is expected to be pro-poor, there 
are many case where such results have not been realized because of poor design.  
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 The country rankings based on human development effort reveal a rather disturbing 
trend where many African countries are ranked lowest. Thus, the countries are characterized 
by the double tragedy of human development income deficit and also human development effort 
deficit. More research is necessary to determine the primary sources of the anti-poor stance 
and the institutional reforms that can yield some quick but durable gains.  The concentration 
of countries in Southern Africa amongst those that have incomes above the threshold level 
but are characterized by human development effort deficit is also of concern. It has been 
alluded to that this could be due to the high prevalence of HIV/Aids in this region. This 
requires further analysis. 
 As a final remark, it is observed that there has been a tendency for countries to 
approach the issue of economic rights by including provisions in their constitutions. It is not 
clear the extent to which such economic rights have aided in advancing economic rights and 
in particular whether in fact that is the most practical way to of advancing such rights. Some 
more analysis of constitutional provisions for economic rights in developing countries and 
the degree to which they are enforced could shed some light on the viability and 
effectiveness of including economic rights provisions in constitutions.  
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Table 1: Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction 
 
Country Poverty 
Rate 
2001 
Growth 
(low) 
Growth 
(high) 
Poverty 2015 
Low growth 
Poverty 2015 
High growth 
Kenya 56 1.5 3.0 32.79 18.80 
Nigeria 60 3.0 6.0 20.14 6.16 
South Africa 50 3.0 6.0 16.78 5.13 
Uganda 35 5.5 11.0 4.41 0.38 
Zimbabwe 70 0.1 3 67.42 23.5 
 
 
 
Table 2: Distribution Adjusted Poverty Reduction 
 
 
Country Poverty 
Rate 
2001 
Growth 
rate 
Gini  Poverty 2015 
Unadjusted for 
inequality 
Poverty 2015 
Adjusted for 
inequality 
Kenya 56 1.5 44.9 32.79 39.40 
Nigeria 60 3.0 50.6 20.14 31.74 
South Africa 50 3.0 59.3 16.78 29.65 
Uganda 35 5.5 37.5 4.41 7.62 
Zimbabwe 70 0.1 50.1 67.58 68.54 
 
 
 
Table 3: Distribution Adjusted Poverty Reduction (assuming inequality was half its 
2001 levels) 
 
Country Poverty 
Rate 
2001 
Growth 
rate 
Gini (lower 
inequality) 
Poverty 2015 
Higher inequality 
Poverty 2015 
Lower inequality 
Kenya 56 1.5 22.45 39.40 34.04 
Nigeria 60 3.0 25.3 31.74 22.73 
South Africa 50 3.0 29.6 29.65 19.99 
Uganda 35 5.5 18.7 7.62 4.65 
Zimbabwe 70 0.1, 3 25.05 68.54 26.31 
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Table 4: Measures of Human Development 
 
Variable  N Minimum Maximum Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Human Development 
Index 
175 0.27 .95 0.69 0.18 
Adult Literacy rate 174 13 100 81.14 20.59 
Life Expectancy 175 32.7 81.5 65.43 12.57 
Primary and secondary 
school enrollment 
174 19 114 69.33 19.65 
Infant Mortality 174 3 165 42.47 39.01 
Per capital income (PPP) 173 560 36600 8768.01 9081.47 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Regressions Results of measures of Human Development against log per 
capita income (PPP) 
 
Dependent Variable  Adult Literacy 
rate 
Life 
Expectancy 
Primary  and 
Secondary 
School 
Enrollment 
Infant 
mortality 
Constant  -23.72 
(-2.66)*** 
-8.36 
(-1.81)* 
-50.67 
(-7.39)*** 
 288.36 
(282.74)*** 
Log per capita 
income 
 12.33 
(11.90)*** 
8.67 
(16.17)*** 
14.07 
(17.64)*** 
-28.93 
(-19.57)*** 
 
Adjusted R-Square   
0.451 
 
0.602 
 
0.645 
 
0.691 
 
t-statistics are in parentheses below the coefficients. Asterisks (***) denote significance at the 
1% level. 
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Figure 1: Relationship Between HDI and Per Capita Income (PPP) 
440.00620.00750.0086 .001020.001410.00480.001650.001860.00224 .002350.002850.003270.003450.003670.004 4 .00420.004650.0030.0055 0.006 20.006380.007380.002 0.008650.001 590.0013680.0015410.0017860.00191 0.002263 .0024210.005440.0027170.004276 .0
py
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
ean H D II
 
Figure 2: Relationship between Primary school Enrollment and Per Capita income 
(PPP) 
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Figure 3 :Relationship Between Infant Mortality and Per Capita Income (PPP) 
 
Figure 4 : Relationship Between Combined Primary and Secondary School 
Enrollment and per Capita income 
(PPP)  
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Figure 5: Human Development Deficit Income 
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Table 6: Time Necessary for Countries to Meet the Human Development Deficit Income 
(Assuming no change in the distribution of income)  
 
Country Per 
capita 
Income 
2002 
Number of Years to 
attain $2400 assuming 
annual growth rate of 
1.5% 
Years to attain 
$2400 assuming 
annual growth 
rate of 3% 
Years to attain 
$2400 assuming 
annual growth 
rate of 4.5% 
Ghana 2130 8 4 2.7 
Angola 2130 8 4 2.7 
Djibouti 1990 12.5 6.3 4.2 
Sudan 1820 18.5 9.3 6.2 
Gambia 1690 23.5 11.8 7.9 
Senegal 1580 28 14.1 9.4 
Cote d’ivore 1520 30.6 15.4 10.3 
Togo 1480 32.4 16.3 10.9 
Uganda 1390 36.6 18.4 12.4 
Rwanda 1270 42.7 21.5 14.4 
Central Africa 
Rep 
1170 48.2 24.3 16.3 
Burkina Faso 1100 52.3 26.3 17.7 
Benin 1070 54.2 27.9 18.3 
Mozambique 1050 55.5 27.9 18.7 
Kenya 1020 57.4 28.9 19.4 
Chad 1020 57.4 28.3 19.4 
Congo 980 60.1 30.3 20.3 
Mali 980 60.1 30.3 20.3 
Eriteria 890 66 33.5 22.5 
Nigeria 860 68.9 34.7 23.3 
Zambia 840 70.5 35.5 23.8 
Niger 840 70.5 35.5 23.8 
Ethiopia 780 75 38 25.5 
Madagascar 740 79.0 39.8 26.7 
Guinea-Bissau 710 81 41.2 27.6 
Congo Demo. 
Rep. 
650 87.7 44.1 29.6 
Burundi 630 89.9 45.2 30.3 
Malawi 580 95.3 48 32.2 
Sierra Leone 520 102.7 51.7 34.7 
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Table 7: Human Development Effort  (pro-poor) Country Rankings  
             (based on Adjusted HDI = f(log PY)53 
 
Country                              PY       HDI         AHDI    LAHDI      PRED            RES      EFFORT 
 
Tajikistan 980 0.671 0.54 -0.61 -1.12610 0.51791 1.00 
Uzbekistan 1,670 0.709 0.55 -0.59 -1.01007 0.41646 2.00 
Kyrgyzstan 1,620 0.701 0.55 -0.60 -1.01668 0.41460 3.00 
Moldova 1,470 0.681 0.53 -0.63 -1.03784 0.40484 4.00 
Georgia 2,260 0.739 0.57 -0.57 -0.94421 0.37445 5.00 
Sao Tomé 1,317 0.645 0.50 -0.69 -1.06176 0.37194 6.00 
Mongolia 1,710 0.668 0.51 -0.67 -1.00491 0.33418 7.00 
Armenia 3,120 0.754 0.56 -0.57 -0.87401 0.30130 8.00 
Viet Nam 2,300 0.691 0.52 -0.66 -0.94039 0.28196 9.00 
Azerbaijan 3,210 0.746 0.55 -0.59 -0.86781 0.27481 10.00 
Solomon Is 1,590 0.624 0.47 -0.75 -1.02075 0.26715 11.00 
Myanmar 1,027 0.551 0.42 -0.87 -1.11591 0.25078 12.00 
Jamaica 3,980 0.764 0.56 -0.58 -0.82101 0.24238 13.00 
Bolivia 2,460 0.681 0.50 -0.68 -0.92575 0.24123 14.00 
       15.00 
Cuba 5,259 0.809 0.59 -0.53 -0.76035 0.23102 16.00 
Sri Lanka 3,570 0.740 0.54 -0.62 -0.84468 0.22849 17.00 
Ecuador 3,580 0.735 0.54 -0.63 -0.84407 0.21858 18.00 
Albania 4,830 0.781 0.56 -0.57 -0.77887 0.20676 19.00 
Philippines 4,170 0.753 0.55 -0.60 -0.81086 0.20633 20.00 
Nicaragua 2,470 0.667 0.49 -0.72 -0.92486 0.20537 21.00 
Honduras 2,600 0.672 0.49 -0.71 -0.91370 0.20442 22.00 
Lebanon 4,360 0.758 0.55 -0.60 -0.80116 0.19968 23.00 
Jordan 4,220 0.750 0.54 -0.61 -0.80826 0.19823 24.00 
Ukraine 4,870 0.777 0.56 -0.58 -0.77707 0.19785 25.00 
Turkmenistan 4,300 0.752 0.54 -0.61 -0.80417 0.19168 26.00 
Belarus 5,520 0.790 0.57 -0.57 -0.74980 0.18182 27.00 
Saint Lucia 5,300 0.777 0.56 -0.59 -0.75866 0.17347 28.00 
Indonesia 3,230 0.692 0.50 -0.70 -0.86646 0.17065 29.00 
Paraguay 4,610 0.751 0.54 -0.62 -0.78902 0.16850 30.00 
Syria 3,620 0.710 0.51 -0.67 -0.84165 0.16830 31.00 
Venezuela 5,380 0.778 0.55 -0.59 -0.75539 0.16601 32.00 
Madagascar 740 0.469 0.36 -1.02 -1.18725 0.16282 33.00 
China 4,580 0.745 0.53 -0.63 -0.79044 0.15870 34.00 
Maldives 4,798 0.752 0.54 -0.62 -0.78032 0.15545 35.00 
Panama 6,170 0.791 0.56 -0.58 -0.72557 0.14753 36.00 
Peru 5,010 0.752 0.54 -0.62 -0.77091 0.14604 37.00 
Uruguay 7,830 0.833 0.59 -0.53 -0.67370 0.14550 38.00 
Bosnia 5,970 0.781 0.55 -0.59 -0.73274 0.14275 39.00 
Samoa  5,600 0.769 0.55 -0.61 -0.74667 0.14092 40.00 
Yemen 870 0.482 0.36 -1.02 -1.15202 0.13591 41.00 
Macedonia 6,470 0.793 0.56 -0.58 -0.71523 0.13482 42.00 
Guyana 4,260 0.719 0.51 -0.68 -0.80621 0.13090 43.00 
Fiji 5,440 0.758 0.53 -0.63 -0.75298 0.12687 44.00 
                                                 
53 Some countries in the larger sample were not ranked because of missing variables—hence the blanks which should 
be ignored in this and next Table. 
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Congo 980 0.494 0.37 -1.00 -1.12610 0.12462 45.00 
Kazakhstan 5,870 0.766 0.54 -0.62 -0.73642 0.11900 46.00 
Bulgaria 7,130 0.796 0.56 -0.58 -0.69409 0.11308 47.00 
Saint V and G 5,460 0.751 0.53 -0.64 -0.75218 0.11289 48.00 
Costa Rica 8,840 0.834 0.58 -0.54 -0.64729 0.10943 49.00 
Colombia 6,370 0.773 0.54 -0.61 -0.71862 0.10798 50.00 
Suriname 6,590 0.780 0.55 -0.60 -0.71123 0.10732 51.00 
Tonga 6,850 0.787 0.55 -0.60 -0.70281 0.10558 52.00 
Romania 6,560 0.778 0.54 -0.61 -0.71222 0.10464 53.00 
Nigeria 860 0.466 0.35 -1.06 -1.15454 0.09322 54.00 
Dominica 5,640 0.743 0.52 -0.65 -0.74512 0.09055 55.00 
Libya 7,570 0.794 0.55 -0.59 -0.68105 0.09046 56.00 
Kenya 1,020 0.488 0.36 -1.03 -1.11739 0.09017 57.00 
El Salvador 4,890 0.720 0.50 -0.69 -0.77618 0.08968 58.00 
Chile 9,820 0.839 0.58 -0.54 -0.62440 0.08369 59.00 
Latvia 9,210 0.823 0.57 -0.56 -0.63836 0.08149 60.00 
Poland 10,560 0.850 0.59 -0.53 -0.60858 0.08095 61.00 
Argentina 10,880 0.853 0.59 -0.52 -0.60209 0.07952 62.00 
Cape Verde 5,000 0.717 0.50 -0.69 -0.77134 0.07886 63.00 
Lithuania 10,320 0.842 0.59 -0.54 -0.61359 0.07802 64.00 
Tanzania 580 0.407 0.31 -1.17 -1.24029 0.07018 65.00 
Turkey 6,390 0.751 0.52 -0.65 -0.71794 0.06594 66.00 
Thailand 7,010 0.768 0.53 -0.63 -0.69778 0.06542 67.00 
Russian  8,230 0.795 0.55 -0.60 -0.66285 0.06198 68.00 
Croatia 10,240 0.830 0.57 -0.56 -0.61528 0.05899 69.00 
Cambodia 2,060 0.568 0.40 -0.91 -0.96438 0.05141 70.00 
Mexico 8,970 0.802 0.55 -0.59 -0.64411 0.04990 71.00 
Belize 6,080 0.737 0.51 -0.68 -0.72877 0.04952 72.00 
Brazil 7,770 0.775 0.53 -0.63 -0.67537 0.04363 73.00 
Estonia 12,260 0.853 0.59 -0.53 -0.57609 0.04222 74.00 
Ghana 2,130 0.568 0.40 -0.92 -0.95710 0.03580 75.00 
Tunisia 6,760 0.745 0.51 -0.67 -0.70569 0.03560 76.00 
Egypt 3,810 0.653 0.45 -0.80 -0.83051 0.03126 77.00 
Trinidad & T 9,430 0.801 0.55 -0.60 -0.63322 0.03113 78.00 
Barbados 15,290 0.888 0.61 -0.50 -0.52801 0.03043 79.00 
Malaysia 9,120 0.793 0.54 -0.61 -0.64050 0.02985 80.00 
Lao 1,720 0.534 0.38 -0.97 -1.00364 0.02902 81.00 
Dominican 6,640 0.738 0.50 -0.68 -0.70959 0.02573 82.00 
Nepal 1,370 0.504 0.36 -1.03 -1.05317 0.02409 83.00 
Saint $N 12,420 0.844 0.58 -0.55 -0.57327 0.02393 84.00 
Comoros 1,690 0.530 0.37 -0.99 -1.00747 0.02219 85.00 
India 2,670 0.595 0.41 -0.89 -0.90791 0.02037 86.00 
Iran 6,690 0.732 0.50 -0.70 -0.70795 0.01214 87.00 
Slovakia 12,840 0.842 0.57 -0.56 -0.56603 0.00741 88.00 
Malawi 580 0.388 0.29 -1.23 -1.24029 0.00700 89.00 
Grenada 7,280 0.745 0.51 -0.68 -0.68955 0.00636 90.00 
Eritrea 890 0.439 0.32 -1.14 -1.14707 0.00451 91.00 
Hungary 13,400 0.848 0.57 -0.55 -0.55673 0.00277 92.00 
Algeria 5,760 0.704 0.48 -0.74 -0.74054 0.00100 93.00 
Guatemala 4,080 0.649 0.44 -0.82 -0.81561 -0.00009 94.00 
Korea 16,950 0.888 0.60 -0.51 -0.50557 -0.00303 95.00 
Greece 18,720 0.902 0.61 -0.49 -0.48395 -0.00707 96.00 
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Czech  15,780 0.868 0.59 -0.53 -0.52114 -0.00989 97.00 
Portugal 18,280 0.897 0.61 -0.50 -0.48913 -0.01010 98.00 
Uganda 1,390 0.493 0.35 -1.06 -1.05002 -0.01034 99.00 
Israel 19,530 0.908 0.61 -0.49 -0.47473 -0.01195 100.00 
Antigua&B 10,920 0.800 0.54 -0.62 -0.60129 -0.01490 101.00 
       102.00 
Slovenia 18,540 0.895 0.61 -0.50 -0.48605 -0.01647 103.00 
New Zealand 21,740 0.926 0.63 -0.47 -0.45139 -0.01701 104.00 
Spain 21,460 0.922 0.62 -0.47 -0.45421 -0.02060 105.00 
Bhutan 1,969 0.536 0.37 -1.00 -0.97421 -0.02184 106.00 
Togo 1,480 0.495 0.35 -1.06 -1.03636 -0.02785 107.00 
Malta 17,640 0.875 0.59 -0.53 -0.49689 -0.03358 108.00 
       109.00 
Cyprus 18,360 0.883 0.59 -0.52 -0.48818 -0.03438 110.00 
Bangladesh 1,700 0.509 0.35 -1.04 -1.00619 -0.03699 111.00 
Sweden 26,050 0.946 0.64 -0.45 -0.41202 -0.04054 112.00 
Mauritius 10,810 0.785 0.53 -0.64 -0.60349 -0.04087 113.00 
Morocco 3,810 0.620 0.42 -0.88 -0.83051 -0.04496 114.00 
PapuaNg 2,270 0.542 0.37 -1.00 -0.94324 -0.05462 115.00 
UK 26,150 0.936 0.63 -0.47 -0.41118 -0.05722 116.00 
Finland 26,190 0.935 0.63 -0.47 -0.41085 -0.05915 117.00 
Japan 26,940 0.938 0.63 -0.47 -0.40471 -0.06051 118.00 
Australia 28,260 0.946 0.63 -0.46 -0.39429 -0.06352 119.00 
Belgium 27,570 0.942 0.63 -0.46 -0.39967 -0.06448 120.00 
Vanuatu 2,890 0.570 0.38 -0.96 -0.89068 -0.06817 121.00 
France 26,920 0.932 0.62 -0.47 -0.40487 -0.06995 122.00 
Sudan 1,820 0.505 0.35 -1.06 -0.99134 -0.07287 123.00 
Kuwait 16,240 0.838 0.55 -0.59 -0.51489 -0.07450 124.00 
Brunei 19,210 0.867 0.57 -0.56 -0.47833 -0.07738 125.00 
Netherlands 29,100 0.942 0.63 -0.47 -0.38792 -0.08156 126.00 
Canada 29,480 0.943 0.63 -0.47 -0.38509 -0.08278 127.00 
Bahrain 17,170 0.843 0.56 -0.59 -0.50277 -0.08362 128.00 
Seychelles 18,232 0.853 0.56 -0.57 -0.48970 -0.08478 129.00 
Italy 26,430 0.920 0.61 -0.49 -0.40887 -0.08543 130.00 
Iceland 29,750 0.941 0.62 -0.47 -0.38311 -0.08796 131.00 
Germany 27,100 0.925 0.61 -0.49 -0.40342 -0.08815 132.00 
Singapore 24,040 0.902 0.60 -0.52 -0.42950 -0.08913 133.00 
Austria 29,220 0.934 0.62 -0.48 -0.38702 -0.09533 134.00 
Switzerland 30,010 0.936 0.62 -0.48 -0.38121 -0.09790 135.00 
Denmark 30,940 0.932 0.61 -0.49 -0.37457 -0.11645 136.00 
Hong Kong 26,910 0.903 0.59 -0.52 -0.40495 -0.11761 137.00 
Pakistan 1,940 0.497 0.33 -1.10 -0.97744 -0.12017 138.00 
Cameroon 2,000 0.501 0.33 -1.10 -0.97081 -0.12481 139.00 
CongoD 650 0.365 0.26 -1.34 -1.21548 -0.12520 140.00 
Saudi Arabia 12,650 0.768 0.50 -0.70 -0.56927 -0.12788 141.00 
Norway 36,600 0.956 0.63 -0.47 -0.33800 -0.13041 142.00 
Bahamas 17,280 0.815 0.53 -0.64 -0.50137 -0.13665 143.00 
Benin 1,070 0.421 0.29 -1.25 -1.10698 -0.13898 144.00 
Oman 13,340 0.770 0.50 -0.70 -0.55771 -0.14213 145.00 
Qatar 19,844 0.833 0.54 -0.62 -0.47126 -0.14555 146.00 
USA 35,750 0.939 0.61 -0.49 -0.34311 -0.14737 147.00 
Zambia 840 0.389 0.27 -1.31 -1.15966 -0.15338 148.00 
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Haiti 1,610 0.463 0.31 -1.17 -1.01803 -0.15423 149.00 
Ireland 36,360 0.936 0.61 -0.50 -0.33943 -0.15596 150.00 
Rwanda 1,270 0.431 0.29 -1.23 -1.06967 -0.16476 151.00 
Gabon 6,590 0.648 0.41 -0.88 -0.71123 -0.16905 152.00 
UArabE 22,420 0.824 0.52 -0.65 -0.44469 -0.20158 153.00 
Gambia 1,690 0.452 0.30 -1.22 -1.00747 -0.21218 154.00 
Lesotho 2,420 0.493 0.32 -1.15 -0.92931 -0.22164 155.00 
Burundi 630 0.339 0.24 -1.45 -1.22229 -0.22305 156.00 
Zimbabwe 2,400 0.491 0.31 -1.16 -0.93112 -0.22618 157.00 
       158.00 
Ethiopia 780 0.359 0.25 -1.40 -1.17579 -0.22799 159.00 
Guinea-Bissau 710 0.350 0.24 -1.43 -1.19626 -0.23085 160.00 
Senegal 1,580 0.437 0.28 -1.26 -1.02213 -0.23783 161.00 
Namibia 6,210 0.607 0.38 -0.98 -0.72416 -0.25135 162.00 
Chad 1,020 0.379 0.25 -1.39 -1.11739 -0.27291 163.00 
South Africa 10,070 0.666 0.41 -0.89 -0.61893 -0.27430 164.00 
Djibouti 1,990 0.454 0.29 -1.25 -0.97190 -0.27521 165.00 
Mauritania 2,220 0.465 0.29 -1.23 -0.94809 -0.28405 166.00 
Côte d'Ivoire 1,520 0.399 0.25 -1.39 -1.03055 -0.35975 167.00 
Mozambique 1,050 0.354 0.22 -1.50 -1.11108 -0.38503 168.00 
Swaziland 4,550 0.519 0.31 -1.19 -0.79187 -0.39339 169.00 
Botswana 8,170 0.589 0.35 -1.06 -0.66445 -0.39783 170.00 
Guinea 2,100 0.425 0.26 -1.37 -0.96019 -0.40630 171.00 
Cafrican R 1,170 0.361 0.22 -1.49 -1.08753 -0.40710 172.00 
Sierra Leone 520 0.273 0.18 -1.72 -1.26406 -0.45259 173.00 
Mali 930 0.326 0.20 -1.60 -1.13750 -0.45869 174.00 
Niger 800 0.292 0.18 -1.74 -1.17028 -0.57078 175.00 
Angola 2,130 0.381 0.21 -1.56 -0.95710 -0.59880 176.00 
Burkina Faso 1,100 0.302 0.17 -1.78 -1.10096 -0.67887 177.00 
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Table 8: Human Development Effort  (pro-poor) Country Rankings 
(based on HDI Rank = f(Income Index) 
 
Country                                                income             HDI         Predicted    Residuals              Effort 
                                                              Index                 Rank        Rank                                        Rank 
                                  
Tajikistan 0.38 116.00 158.43130 -42.43130 1.00 
Cuba 0.66 52.00 86.82781 -34.82781 2.00 
Uzbekistan 0.47 107.00 135.41589 -28.41589 3.00 
Kyrgyzstan 0.46 110.00 137.97316 -27.97316 4.00 
Armenia 0.57 82.00 109.84322 -27.84322 5.00 
Moldova, Rep. of 0.45 113.00 140.53043 -27.53043 6.00 
Georgia 0.52 97.00 122.62956 -25.62956 7.00 
Albania 0.65 65.00 89.38508 -24.38508 8.00 
Myanmar 0.39 132.00 155.87403 -23.87403 9.00 
Uruguay 0.73 46.00 68.92694 -22.92694 10.00 
Sao Tomé and Principe 0.43 123.00 145.64496 -22.64496 11.00 
Belarus 0.67 62.00 84.27055 -22.27055 12.00 
Argentina 0.78 34.00 56.14060 -22.14060 13.00 
Madagascar 0.33 150.00 171.21764 -21.21764 14.00 
      
Jamaica 0.61 79.00 99.61415 -20.61415 16.00 
Tanzania, U. Rep. of 0.29 162.00 181.44670 -19.44670 17.00 
Ukraine 0.65 70.00 89.38508 -19.38508 18.00 
Poland 0.78 37.00 56.14060 -19.14060 19.00 
Costa Rica 0.75 45.00 63.81241 -18.81241 20.00 
Mongolia 0.47 117.00 135.41589 -18.41589 21.00 
Panama 0.69 61.00 79.15601 -18.15601 22.00 
Bulgaria 0.71 56.00 74.04148 -18.04148 23.00 
Lithuania 0.77 41.00 58.69787 -17.69787 24.00 
Macedonia, TFYR 0.70 60.00 76.59874 -16.59874 25.00 
Malawi 0.29 165.00 181.44670 -16.44670 26.00 
Azerbaijan 0.58 91.00 107.28595 -16.28595 27.00 
Venezuela 0.67 68.00 84.27055 -16.27055 28.00 
Saint Lucia 0.66 71.00 86.82781 -15.82781 29.00 
Sweden 0.93 2.00 17.78159 -15.78159 30.00 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.68 66.00 81.71328 -15.71328 31.00 
Chile 0.77 43.00 58.69787 -15.69787 32.00 
Estonia 0.80 36.00 51.02607 -15.02607 33.00 
Yemen 0.36 149.00 163.54583 -14.54583 34.00 
Lebanon 0.63 80.00 94.49961 -14.49961 35.00 
Congo 0.38 144.00 158.43130 -14.43130 36.00 
Philippines 0.62 83.00 97.05688 -14.05688 37.00 
Solomon Islands 0.46 124.00 137.97316 -13.97316 38.00 
Latvia 0.75 50.00 63.81241 -13.81241 39.00 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 0.72 58.00 71.48421 -13.48421 40.00 
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Nigeria 0.36 151.00 163.54583 -12.54583 41.00 
Australia 0.94 3.00 15.22433 -12.22433 42.00 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.80 39.00 51.02607 -12.02607 43.00 
Barbados 0.84 29.00 40.79700 -11.79700 44.00 
Tonga 0.71 63.00 74.04148 -11.04148 45.00 
Mexico 0.75 53.00 63.81241 -10.81241 46.00 
Croatia 0.77 48.00 58.69787 -10.69787 47.00 
Viet Nam 0.52 112.00 122.62956 -10.62956 48.00 
Suriname 0.70 67.00 76.59874 -9.59874 49.00 
Russian Federation 0.74 57.00 66.36967 -9.36967 50.00 
Samoa (Western) 0.67 75.00 84.27055 -9.27055 51.00 
Belgium 0.94 6.00 15.22433 -9.22433 52.00 
Greece 0.87 24.00 33.12520 -9.12520 53.00 
Czech Republic 0.84 32.00 40.79700 -8.79700 54.00 
Japan 0.93 9.00 17.78159 -8.78159 55.00 
Canada 0.95 4.00 12.66706 -8.66706 56.00 
Israel 0.88 22.00 30.56793 -8.56793 57.00 
Turkmenistan 0.63 86.00 94.49961 -8.49961 58.00 
Congo, Dem. Rep. of the 0.31 168.00 176.33217 -8.33217 59.00 
Hungary 0.82 38.00 45.91154 -7.91154 60.00 
Kenya 0.39 148.00 155.87403 -7.87403 61.00 
Korea, Rep. of 0.86 28.00 35.68247 -7.68247 62.00 
Netherlands 0.95 5.00 12.66706 -7.66706 63.00 
Romania 0.70 69.00 76.59874 -7.59874 64.00 
Eritrea 0.36 156.00 163.54583 -7.54583 65.00 
New Zealand 0.90 18.00 25.45340 -7.45340 66.00 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.76 54.00 61.25514 -7.25514 67.00 
Portugal 0.87 26.00 33.12520 -7.12520 68.00 
Jordan 0.62 90.00 97.05688 -7.05688 69.00 
Sierra Leone 0.28 177.00 184.00397 -7.00397 70.00 
Slovakia 0.81 42.00 48.46880 -6.46880 71.00 
Sri Lanka 0.60 96.00 102.17142 -6.17142 72.00 
Colombia 0.69 73.00 79.15601 -6.15601 73.00 
Slovenia 0.87 27.00 33.12520 -6.12520 74.00 
Bolivia 0.53 114.00 120.07229 -6.07229 75.00 
United Kingdom 0.93 12.00 17.78159 -5.78159 76.00 
Iceland 0.95 7.00 12.66706 -5.66706 77.00 
Spain 0.90 20.00 25.45340 -5.45340 78.00 
Maldives 0.65 84.00 89.38508 -5.38508 79.00 
Malaysia 0.75 59.00 63.81241 -4.81241 80.00 
Finland 0.93 13.00 17.78159 -4.78159 81.00 
Malta 0.86 31.00 35.68247 -4.68247 82.00 
Peru 0.65 85.00 89.38508 -4.38508 83.00 
Kazakhstan 0.68 78.00 81.71328 -3.71328 84.00 
Burundi 0.31 173.00 176.33217 -3.33217 85.00 
Fiji 0.67 81.00 84.27055 -3.27055 86.00 
Cyprus 0.87 30.00 33.12520 -3.12520 87.00 
Nepal 0.44 140.00 143.08769 -3.08769 88.00 
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Paraguay 0.64 89.00 91.94235 -2.94235 89.00 
Honduras 0.54 115.00 117.51502 -2.51502 90.00 
Ecuador 0.60 100.00 102.17142 -2.17142 91.00 
France 0.93 16.00 17.78159 -1.78159 92.00 
Switzerland 0.95 11.00 12.66706 -1.66706 93.00 
Norway 0.99 1.00 2.43799 -1.43799 94.00 
Antigua and Barbuda 0.78 55.00 56.14060 -1.14060 95.00 
Lao People's Dem.  Rep. 0.47 135.00 135.41589 -0.41589 96.00 
Zambia 0.36 164.00 163.54583 0.45417 97.00 
Nicaragua 0.54 118.00 117.51502 0.48498 98.00 
Comoros 0.47 136.00 135.41589 0.58411 99.00 
Guinea-Bissau 0.33 172.00 171.21764 0.78236 100.00 
Austria 0.95 14.00 12.66706 1.33294 101.00 
      
Ethiopia 0.34 170.00 168.66037 1.33963 103.00 
Seychelles 0.87 35.00 33.12520 1.87480 104.00 
Thailand 0.71 76.00 74.04148 1.95852 105.00 
China 0.64 94.00 91.94235 2.05765 106.00 
Cambodia 0.50 130.00 127.74409 2.25591 107.00 
Brunei Darussalam 0.88 33.00 30.56793 2.43207 108.00 
      
Togo 0.45 143.00 140.53043 2.46957 110.00 
Bangladesh 0.47 138.00 135.41589 2.58411 111.00 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 0.67 87.00 84.27055 2.72945 112.00 
Uganda 0.44 146.00 143.08769 2.91231 113.00 
United States 0.98 8.00 4.99526 3.00474 114.00 
Brazil 0.73 72.00 68.92694 3.07306 115.00 
Italy 0.93 21.00 17.78159 3.21841 116.00 
Indonesia 0.58 111.00 107.28595 3.71405 117.00 
Germany 0.94 19.00 15.22433 3.77567 118.00 
Syrian Arab Republic 0.60 106.00 102.17142 3.82858 119.00 
Bahrain 0.86 40.00 35.68247 4.31753 120.00 
Singapore 0.92 25.00 20.33886 4.66114 121.00 
Ireland 0.98 10.00 4.99526 5.00474 122.00 
Hong Kong, China (SAR) 0.93 23.00 17.78159 5.21841 123.00 
Kuwait 0.85 44.00 38.23973 5.76027 124.00 
Ghana 0.51 131.00 125.18682 5.81318 125.00 
Sudan 0.48 139.00 132.85863 6.14137 126.00 
Bhutan 0.50 134.00 127.74409 6.25591 127.00 
Denmark 0.96 17.00 10.10979 6.89021 128.00 
Benin 0.40 161.00 153.31676 7.68324 129.00 
Mauritius 0.78 64.00 56.14060 7.85940 130.00 
Turkey 0.69 88.00 79.15601 8.84399 131.00 
Guyana 0.63 104.00 94.49961 9.50039 132.00 
Niger 0.35 176.00 166.10310 9.89690 133.00 
Papua New Guinea 0.52 133.00 122.62956 10.37044 134.00 
Dominica 0.67 95.00 84.27055 10.72945 135.00 
Rwanda 0.42 159.00 148.20223 10.79777 136.00 
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Chad 0.39 167.00 155.87403 11.12597 137.00 
Pakistan 0.49 142.00 130.30136 11.69864 138.00 
India 0.55 127.00 114.95775 12.04225 139.00 
Mali 0.37 174.00 160.98857 13.01143 140.00 
Cameroon 0.50 141.00 127.74409 13.25591 141.00 
El Salvador 0.65 103.00 89.38508 13.61492 142.00 
Haiti 0.46 153.00 137.97316 15.02684 143.00 
Mozambique 0.39 171.00 155.87403 15.12597 144.00 
Bahamas 0.86 51.00 35.68247 15.31753 145.00 
Tunisia 0.70 92.00 76.59874 15.40126 146.00 
Cape Verde 0.65 105.00 89.38508 15.61492 147.00 
Qatar 0.88 47.00 30.56793 16.43207 148.00 
Vanuatu 0.56 129.00 112.40049 16.59951 149.00 
Central African Republic 0.41 169.00 150.75950 18.24050 150.00 
Senegal 0.46 157.00 137.97316 19.02684 151.00 
Gambia 0.47 155.00 135.41589 19.58411 152.00 
Belize 0.69 99.00 79.15601 19.84399 153.00 
Egypt 0.61 120.00 99.61415 20.38585 154.00 
Dominican Republic 0.70 98.00 76.59874 21.40126 155.00 
Grenada 0.72 93.00 71.48421 21.51579 156.00 
Burkina Faso 0.40 175.00 153.31676 21.68324 157.00 
      
Côte d'Ivoire 0.45 163.00 140.53043 22.46957 159.00 
United Arab Emirates 0.90 49.00 25.45340 23.54660 160.00 
Guatemala 0.62 121.00 97.05688 23.94312 161.00 
Iran, Islamic Rep. of 0.70 101.00 76.59874 24.40126 162.00 
Lesotho 0.53 145.00 120.07229 24.92771 163.00 
Morocco 0.61 125.00 99.61415 25.38585 164.00 
Djibouti 0.50 154.00 127.74409 26.25591 165.00 
Algeria 0.68 108.00 81.71328 26.28672 166.00 
Zimbabwe 0.53 147.00 120.07229 26.92771 167.00 
Oman 0.82 74.00 45.91154 28.08846 168.00 
Saudi Arabia 0.81 77.00 48.46880 28.53120 169.00 
Mauritania 0.52 152.00 122.62956 29.37044 170.00 
Guinea 0.51 160.00 125.18682 34.81318 171.00 
Angola 0.51 166.00 125.18682 40.81318 172.00 
Swaziland 0.64 137.00 91.94235 45.05765 173.00 
Gabon 0.70 122.00 76.59874 45.40126 174.00 
Namibia 0.69 126.00 79.15601 46.84399 175.00 
Botswana 0.73 128.00 68.92694 59.07306 176.00 
South Africa 0.77 119.00 58.69787 60.30213 177.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 59 
 60 
Table 9: Policies to Promote Pro-Poor Growth: Research Findings, Consensus Policies, and Remaining Debates54 
Policy Issue 
 
Research Finding 
 
Agreed Policy Implication 
 
Areas of Debate 
 
Macroeconomic 
Stability (see also 
individual areas 
of macro policy) 
 
Macroeconomic stability critical necessary (though 
not sufficient) condition for pro poor growth; poor 
hurt particularly by high inflation and high macro 
volatility. 
 
Monetary and exchange rate policy should aim for low 
inflation and competitive exchange rates; fiscal policy 
should 
aim for low budget deficits; 
 
Role of exchange rate policy to 
fight inflation; 
pace and extent of stabilization 
during crises. 
 
Monetary and 
Exchange Rate 
Policy 
 
Overvalued exchange rates and high black market 
premia hurt economic growth and tend to be anti-
poor. 
 
A competitive and possibly undervalued exchange rate 
a critical ingredient to ensure macro stability; 
government intervention necessary to manage capital 
inflows: 
 
Fixed or floating rates? Role of 
capital controls 
manage inflows and outflows 
during crises? 
 
Fiscal Stance 
 
Large budget deficits hurt growth and are 
unsustainable. Rapid expenditure cuts can often 
undermine delivery and quality of critical services 
health and education) and hurt the poor. 
 
Governments should aim for moderate budget deficits 
through broadening of the tax base and, if necessary, a 
refocusing of expenditures (esp. cuts in subsidies to 
stateowned enterprises and unproductive sectors). 
During crises not feasible or desirable to cut 
expenditures fast. 
 
Mix of tax increases, tax 
broadening, and 
expenditure cuts? 
 
Privatization 
 
Loss-making state-owned enterprises undermine 
fiscal stability, with negative implications for the 
poor. Some privatizations have been captured by 
local elites and have not led to better services for 
poor. 
 
Reform of loss making state-owned enterprises and 
parastatal critical. Privatization processes must be 
transparent and competitive. 
 
How to ensure expansion of 
services for the 
poor? Use of cross-subsidies for 
vital 
services? 
 
Financial Sector 
 
Severe financial repression hurts savings and 
promotes capital flight. Poorly sequenced 
financial sector reforms can be counter-productive 
and destabilizing. 
 
Capital account and financial sector reform should be 
phased slowly, be implemented only if macro stability 
has been achieved, and be accompanied by tight 
regulation, 
competition policies, and policies to improve access 
of the poor. 
 
State allocation of credit to priority 
sectors? 
State involvement in credit for the 
poor? 
Policies to mobilize domestic 
savings? 
 
Trade Policy 
 
Anti-export bias hurts growth and the poor; import 
liberalization can be anti-poor and not sufficient to 
generate supply response. Diversification essential for 
long-term growth. 
 
Focus on removal of anti-export bias (competitive 
exchange rate, duty draw-back schemes, etc); 
provision of infrastructure to assist exports, esp. for 
export diversification. 
 
More activist state intervention to 
boost 
non-traditional exports (e.g. export 
subsidies, 
subsidized credit for exporters)? 
 
                                                 
54 This Table is extracted from Klasen (2001). 
 61 
Agriculture 
 
Raising agricultural productivity critical for pro 
poor growth. Removal of price distortions necessary 
but not sufficient in the presence of other market 
failures. Protection and subsidies in North hurt poor 
in South. 
 
Renewed emphasis on agricultural research and 
extension, rural infrastructure, and competitive 
marketing and input 
supplies. Open access to OECD markets and removal 
of OECD subsidies critical. 
 
How to stimulate non-traditional 
agricultural 
exports? Role of subsidies to 
promote new seeds and fertilizer 
use? 
 
Industrial Policy 
 
Removal of distortions necessary but not sufficient 
for vibrant industrial sector, esp. small and medium 
enterprises. 
 
Focus on providing infrastructure and services to 
industrial sector. 
 
Activist industrial policy? State 
credit or 
subsidies? Cluster initiatives? 
 
Human Capital 
 
Lack of human capital of the poor hurts growth and 
 
Increased investment in education and health, 
particularly 
 
How to finance expansion of 
primary education 
 
 
 poverty reduction. Education and health services 
have suffered greatly under  economic crises and 
SAPs. 
Credit constraints and high costs for health 
significant deterrent for the poor. 
 
basic education and primary health care; greater focus 
on 
quality; reallocation of public spending to the poor, 
lowering costs of primary health care and education 
through greater subsidies and use subsidized 
community insurance. 
 
health care (esp. in Africa)? Phasing 
out of all 
user fees for primary health care 
and education? 
 
Asset Inequality 
 
Asset inequality (in particular land) reduces economic 
growth and poverty impact of growth. 
 
On land inequality: Removal of subsidies to large 
landowner, land taxes to increase land for sale; land 
redistribution 
necessary. Other asset inequalities: microcredit and 
subsidies for infrastructure extensions for the poor 
(e.g. 
electricity hook-ups) 
 
On land inequality: Market- and 
subsidy-based la 
reform versus quick one-off (partly) 
confiscatory 
land reform. Other asset 
inequalities: role of land 
and inheritance taxes to reduce 
asset inequality? 
 
Income Inequality 
 
High income inequality associated with higher 
poverty and lower poverty impact of growth; high 
initial income inequality may reduce subsequent grow 
 
Safety nets, social funds, and some targeted cash and 
in-kind transfers to the poor. 
 
Increasing progressivity of tax 
system (e.g. 
luxury VAT and import duties, 
greater reliance 
on personal income tax for formal 
sector 
employed)? Scaling up of 
redistributive transfer 
programs (e.g. Progresa)? 
 
Gender Inequality 
 
Gender inequality reduced growth and makes growth 
less pro poor. 
More supply of education for girls plus targeted 
subsidies 
How to fund expansion of female 
education? 
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 to boost enrollments; removal of restrictions on 
female 
control of other assets; political empowerment of 
women. 
 
Role of affirmative action policies 
in labor 
market? 
 
Regional 
Inequality 
 
Regional inequality can sharply reduce impact of 
growth on poverty; possibility of regional 
poverty traps. 
 
Targeting of state transfer programs and safety nets 
on 
regions with high poverty concentration; Focus on 
improving  infrastructure; Regional inequality to be 
considered in 
programs of decentralization and fiscal equalization 
 
How to promote economic growth 
in backward 
Regions? The role of regionally 
targeted  
Industrial policy? Role of incentives 
to move 
industries or people? 
 
Population Policy 
 
High fertility among the poor a constraint to pro poo 
growth. Inequality reduction often a result of fertility 
decline among the poor. 
 
Emphasis on female education and employment as 
well as 
access to reproductive health services. 
 
Role of family planning policies? 
How to alter 
incentives for large families among 
the poor? 
 
Security 
 
Physical and social security essential for pro poor 
growth 
 
Safety nets and greater physical security essential 
measures 
promote pro poor growth 
 
Public and private roles in safety 
net, e.g. credit 
and insurance provision? How 
extensive? 
How funded? 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy Issue 
 
Research Finding 
 
Agreed Policy Implication 
 
Areas of Debate 
 
Governance 
 
Poor governance, corruption, political instability 
and civil strife a major deterrent to investment, 
growth, and poverty reduction. Poor suffer more 
under poor governance. 
 
Reducing incentives and possibilities for corruption by 
simplifying rules and regulations that invite rent-
seeking behavior; merit-based pay and recruitment; 
increase public accountability through greater 
transparency, better institution  oversight of 
governments (parliaments, independent boards) 
and decentralization. Donor support for conflict 
prevention resolution, and post-conflict 
reconstruction critical. 
 
Role of privatization to improve 
governance? 
How to improve governance when 
public 
sector is contracting? Role of the 
state where 
state capacity is weak? Reliance on 
parliaments 
or extra-parliamentary means for 
public 
oversight? How to ensure 
decentralization that 
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reduces incentives and possibilities 
for 
corruption? 
 
Private Secto 
 
Indigenous private sector critical for employment 
growth and dynamic economy. 
 
State assistance with capacity-building, finance (esp. 
microfinance), dialogue between state and domestic 
private sector. 
 
Role of national vs. Multinational 
companies? 
 
Political 
Economy 
of Reform 
 
Domestic political economy crucial for success. 
Pro-poor coalitions necessary to implement package 
 
Dialogue to replace donor conditionality. 
Empowerment  poor and local analytical and research 
capacity critical for implementation. 
 
Role of financial aid and 
conditionality under som 
circumstances? Empowerment 
from 
outside possible/desirable? 
 
Donor Policies 
 
Donors can assist with pro poor growth when 
advice is focused on poorest countries and 
with highest poverty impact of policies. 
 
Aid should be focused on poorest countries that 
promote 
pro poor growth, should flow through budget and be 
accounted for using national processes, and observe 
country leadership. 
 
What to do in poor countries with 
poor 
policies? Interactions between 
donors and civil 
society? How to ensure 
accountability of 
resources? 
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Table 10: Human Development Effort and Institutions 
 
                                           A 
Low-income (below the threshold income) /high human development 
countries 
 
    Uzebekistan 
    Kyrgyzstan 
    Georgia 
    Vietnam                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean HDI 
                                                 C 
 
Moderate to High income (above the threshold income)/high human development 
 
Developed                                Developing/Transitional 
Norway                                     Armenia 
Sweden                                     Azerbajan 
United Kingdom                       Costa Rica 
United States                            Cuba 
Japan                                         Jamaicca 
Canada                                      Sri Lanka 
Iceland                                      Fiji 
Ireland                                       Albania 
                      
                               Mean HDI 
                              B 
Human development “Income deficit” Countries 
    
Effort deficit                      Not Effort Deficit                        
             
Angola                                  Tajikistan 
Burkina Faso                         Mongolia 
Niger                                     Romania 
Mali                                       Moldova 
                                              Solomon Islands 
 
                       D 
Human development “Effort Deficit” countries (above threshold income but low 
HDI) 
 
South Africa                            Namibia 
Swaziland                                Gabon                             
Botswana                                 Zimbabwe                                 
Namibia                                     
 
 
                                                                                                      Y* 
                                                                                     Per Capita Income (PPP) 
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Table 11: Regression Results for the Determinants of Human Development Effort (Pro-Poor Policies)  (N= 138) 
 
Dependent Var/ 
Independent Var. 
Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Constant 
 
 
-0.509 
(-15.66)*** 
-0.431 
(-15.27)*** 
 
-0.530 
(-15.49))*** 
-0.668 
(-22.17)*** 
-0.466 
(-5.41)*** 
-0.252 
(-4.46)*** 
-0.406 
(13.94)*** 
-0.279 
(-4.64)*** 
-0.282 
(-4.68)*** 
Democracy Rank -0.646 
(-9.90)*** 
    -0.001 
(-2.55)** 
-0.001 
(-2.17)* 
-0.001 
(-2.00)* 
 
Corruption Rank  -0.005 
(-13.67)** 
   -0.004 
(-6.05)*** 
-0.004 
(-5.60)*** 
-0.004 
(-5.77)*** 
-0.004 
(-7.17)*** 
Press Freedom Rank   -0.004 
(-8.67)*** 
     -0.001 
(-1.79)* 
Instability index    -0.054 
(-5.37)*** 
  -0.017 
(-1.93)* 
-0.016 
(-1.84)* 
-0.017 
(-1.88)* 
Inequality Index     -0.008 
(3.69)*** 
-0.004 
(-3.17)*** 
 -0.003 
(-2.10)* 
-0.003 
(-1.95)* 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.413 0.592 0.350 0.189 0.092 0.674  0.664 .701 0.698 
  
